# Daily Report

# East Europe

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*FBIS-EEU-95-234* *6 December 1995*

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### Impact of Lifting FRY Embargo Reported

*AU0612081295 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 5 Dec 95 p 6*

[Article by Musa Kurtulaj: "What Has Been Lost With the End of the Embargo?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Our state authorities officially announced the suspension of the embargo against former Yugoslavia [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—FRY] last Thursday [30 November], when the General Customs Directorate informed its Shkoder branch of the lifting of the measures imposed by the Council of Ministers on 16 June 1993. The export and import of goods at the Han i Hotit border crossing is now allowed, and customs officers have been instructed to speed up their procedures. The United Nations imposed the embargo against the former Yugoslavia in May 1992. The railroad station of Bajze was the first to suffer in the Shkoder and Malesia e Madhe area, and has been closed ever since. Under these circumstances, smuggling flourished. The enormous scale of oil smuggling cast a shadow of suspicion over our own state authorities. Even though these authorities issued denials and made a fuss on television now and then, they failed to persuade the public that they were not involved. The agreement on the former Yugoslavia reached in the United States automatically led to the end of the oil smuggling and a significant fall in the daily turnover of Albanian traders. This was immediately apparent on the currency exchange market, on which the U.S. dollar and the German mark rose significantly. It is thought that the embargo against the former Yugoslavia meant a loss to our country of $500 million. Some observers say that hundreds of families of Shkoder and Malesia e Madhe who survived on the daily trade with Montenegro will be unable to meet their minimum needs if they do not receive welfare from the local authorities.

### Socialist Party Seeks New Electoral Candidates

*AU0612112195 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 5 Dec 95 p 3*

[Article by Arian Cani: "Socialist Party: We Need New Deputies"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—"Bring us the names of new deputies," was the gist of an expected appeal that the Socialist leadership has issued to its branches nationwide. The decision was made at an extraordinary and very long meeting of the Socialist Party [PS] Presidium yesterday. The party announces that the General Management Committee will meet again very soon, perhaps before the end of December. In a special statement, the Socialists bitterly attack the ruling party, accusing it of corruption, and again condemn the most recent law on the "opening of the files," as well as attacking some newspapers which, they claim, "are sold under Safet Zhulali's Order No. 478." In yesterday's press statement, the PS claims 104,000 members nationwide and implies that it has no difficulty in selecting new candidates for deputies. At its extraordinary meeting, the PS Presidium decided to draft a new electoral manifesto as soon as possible, to organize conferences in the districts and a congress of the Socialist Women's Organization, and to cooperate with other political forces. "Let us speed up the organization of district party conferences to discuss the party manifesto and candidates." The PS Presidium's decision yesterday conclusively confirms the concern and urgency evident a few days ago at the meeting of the four Socialist leaders in Servet Pellumbi's office. In connection with the forthcoming elections, the Socialists allude to the recent "law on the files," and say that "we will win." Yesterday's statement, even though issued by the PS offices, says that "Nothing will prevent the PS and other opposition forces from winning the elections." Thus, the Socialists now speak on behalf of other political parties. Is this to avoid feeling lonely? The communique certainly makes no comment on this assertion. Only a few days ago, last Friday [1 Dec], the four PS leaders met in Deputy Chairman Servet Pellumbi's office after the parliament's approval of the "Law on the Vetting of Official Persons" Concern was immediately apparent at PS headquarters. "What shall we do now that the law has been approved?" "What might be the implications for the PS?" These were the concerns of the most senior PS leadership, which cannot effectively make any decision without a full presidium meeting. Although it confirmed again its position against the "law on the files," the PS issued an appeal to the grass roots to muster its candidates.

### SP 'Euphoria' Criticized

*AU0612085995 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 5 Dec 95 p 7*

[Commentary by Nikolle Lesi: "The Socialists' Euphoria"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialists have, so far, been more confident than others of a landslide victory in the 1996 elections. But euphoria alone is not enough. It is not enough to say that you can be ready for an election in one month, that "we are certain of a great victory." In the five years of Albania's experience, every great victory has been followed very soon by an equally great defeat. Everybody now knows the facts. The Albanian Workers Party (the Socialist Party) [PS] won on 31 March 1991, but lost on 22 March 1992. The Democratic Party [PD] won on 22 March 1992,

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but lost in the local elections of June 1992. According to this logic, the PS will win next year, but will lose again the following year. This kind of government-by-ricochet occurs because the parties still have no career politicians, and because assuming power is not seen as a way of presenting a better alternative to your political opponents but as revenge on your predecessors. The largest opposition party is in the grip of this kind of combined euphoria and spite, made worse when some PS leaders say that they will be able to govern without allies. This euphoria makes you pause before casting your vote as if in a casino. What is most alarming is the attitude of some who say they will "take a firm hand" in government. It must be explained to people whether this "firm hand" is to rein in crime, to stop rapists from wandering around freely, and to bring to book corrupt officials, or to put political opponents in prison as the PD has done. Their political and economic alternatives are not helping the Socialists to recover from the blows they have received from the "Genocide Law" and the "Law on the Moral Character of Persons of Standing." Medium and large-scale businessmen are gripped by a fear of higher taxes following a Socialist victory. Nor has the Socialists' "new broom" of a newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT issued any explanation, for example, of what the Socialists in power will do to fraudulent traders who have not paid any taxes during the time of the PD. Will they be subjected to the law like the rest? There can be no market economy without traders. There can be no jobs, and no taxes for the state to retain. There may be a real danger of egalitarianism when the Socialists come to power. If the Socialists are to be restrained from behaving as they wish, people must vote for a broader spectrum that will oblige the Socialists to enter into a coalition. The experience of the PD-Social Democratic-Republican coalition was a painful one, because it was the PD that laid down the law. A coalition would be to the good of the Socialists, but they fail to understand this, and so are scaring everybody. The PD too needs a coalition, if it wins in 1996. In practice, Albania can no longer be governed without a coalition, and certainly not with the current euphoria of the Socialists.

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### 'U.S. Style' in Dayton Talks 'Created Pitfalls'

*AU0612135295 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 2 Dec 95 p 7*

[Commentary by Konstantin Ivanov: "The Style of Simplification Has Created Pitfalls in Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "We are victims of the U.S. style of journalism. When something is complex or they don't understand it, they simplify it: One side are the baddies, while the others are the goodies; the Indians are on one side, and the cowboys on the other. I have the feeling that I am an Indian." These words come from an officer in the Bosnian Serb army and were spoken in the context of the biased approach adopted by the U.S. press in condemning one of the sides in the conflict as devils, although none of the parties to the conflict holds a monopoly on acts of brutality.

Worse still, this simplification approach was applied to some extent in reaching the peace agreement in Dayton. This is especially true in the way that Sarajevo's fate was decided. The city is to be handed over to the administration of the Bosnian Muslim Government, yet some districts of Sarajevo contain a Serbian population, numbering about 100,000 inhabitants in all. Immediately the peace agreement was announced, they went out into the streets to protest against the way in which the status of their city had been decided. Their fears are by no means groundless. Four years of bloodshed and enmity cannot be forgotten or swept away with a wave of a magic wand. The declarations contained in the agreement that their rights will be guaranteed are evidently not enough to reassure them. Their fears meet with understanding on the part of the unprejudiced UN observers on the spot, because they have immediate impressions of the real situation. The UN Protection Force commander foresaw that the withdrawal of the Bosnian Serb armed units from the zones they control in Sarajevo, as the agreement stipulates, will provoke an exodus of the civilian population. This prediction has already been confirmed; according to the latest reports, many Serbs in the Sarajevo districts of Ilidza and Grbavica are abandoning their homes.

It is obvious that even the EU mediator, Carl Bildt, is not convinced of the effectiveness and enforceability of the guarantees proclaimed in the Dayton Agreement, since he is insisting that the Bosnian Government commits itself to giving security assurances to the Sarajevo Serbs. In a message to President Clinton, French President Chirac thought it desirable that the guarantees of security given to the Serbian population of Sarajevo should be reinforced. To reassure the Serbian population, Paris proposes the formation of a UN civil police force. The unequivocal reaction of Bosnian Prime Minister Silajdzic was that any review of the decisions adopted regarding Sarajevo is excluded.

Massive U.S. pressure compelled Milosevic, Izetbegovic, and Tudjman to sign the long-awaited peace agreement, while holding them in detention for three weeks at the air force base in Dayton. However, the U.S. style that was applied of simplifying the complex and variegated Balkan picture, and that is so difficult to comprehend from a distance, may have created pitfalls in which the otherwise noble intentions might vanish without trace.

### Pirinski Pledges Active Cooperation on Peace Plan

*AU0512175495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] On 5 December Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski departed for Brussels, where he will take part in the work of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council.

Prior to his departure at Sofia Airport Minister Pirinski said:

[Begin recording] I will express Bulgaria's official position in Brussels, namely, that our country is prepared to cooperate actively in implementing the peace agreements on Bosnia-Herzegovina, restoring the region, and stabilizing it in a lasting manner. We hope that the agreements to be be finalized in Paris will really withstand the test of their application in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Naturally, we are seeking a most active role in the postwar reconstruction and development of the region. [end recording]

### Dogan Says Rights Violated Over Kurdzhali Affair

*AU0512182495 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Seven ambassadors and diplomats of EU member states, as well as the ambassadors of the United States and Turkey to Bulgaria, have met with the leadership of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS] and Rasim Musa, the disputed mayor of Kurdzhali.

The meeting was prompted by the problems that arose in Kurdzhali during the municipal elections, and their consequences.

DPS leader Ahmed Dogan explained the reasons behind the meeting:

[Begin recording] We feel a certain discomfort that, precisely when the National Assembly approved our official candidacy for membership in the EU, we must draw

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the attention of the EU countries to the Bulgarian Government's discrimination and double standards regarding the Kurdzhali Municipality. I stress the words double standards because more than five municipalities are in the same situation; however, we represent the only exceptional case. From this point of view, we do not want this to reflect upon our candidacy for EU membership. Nevertheless, it must be clear the genuine protection of human rights is among the main priorities and prerequisites that should influence EU membership. In addition, the preference of the voters and observing the Election Law are preconditions of a democratic system. These two preconditions have been violated in the case of Kurdzhali. [end recording]

### Zhelev Intervention Criticized

*AU0612134195 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 2 Dec 95 p 8*

[Editorial: "Mr. Zhelev Blundered With Kurdzhali"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zhelev paid humble obeisance to Dogan [Ahmed Dogan, leader of the ethnic Turks' Movement for Rights and Freedoms] by intervening in the "Kurdzhali" scandal.

This is a blatant election campaign ploy to win the votes of the Turkish electorate, but it is not a winning move.

The president should not have interceded with the authorities on behalf of the Falcon [Dogan's sobriquet] and his mayor. This is the second mistake Zhelev has made, since he canvassed for Sofiyanski [the new mayor of Sofia] in the local elections.

The "Musa" [new mayor of Kurdzhali] issue is a matter for the judges to decide, and neither the president nor the prime minister can intervene. This is the position under the Constitution.

### Triada Energy Company Chief Explains Activities

*AU0412200195 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 1 Dec 95 p 6*

[Interview with Georgi Stefanov, executive director of the Bulgarian-Russian Triada Company, by Veselka Marinova; place and date not given: "Triada Was Formed To Help the Energy Industry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Marinova] Mr. Stefanov, what appears on the Triada Company's visiting card?

[Stefanov] Triada is an international joint stock company that was formed at the beginning of this year by Russian and Bulgarian firms with state capital. The principal founders on the Russian side were Atomenergoeksport, Zarubezhatomenergostroy, and the Ozhig Association. The principal Bulgarian shareholders are the NEC [National Electricity Company], Energoproekt, and Energoremont. The mixed Bulgarian-Russian Investment Bank is a founder.

[Marinova] Why did you set up Triada when there are so many existing organizations in the energy industry?

[Stefanov] The company was formed at the initiative of the Committee on Power Supply and the NEC. Its aims are to operate in the energy industry field and, first and foremost, to resolve certain "complex issues." One of the directions of its activities is the nuclear power industry—the modernization and provision of certain specific conditions for the operation of the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant, and, of course, matters relating to the construction of the second nuclear power plant. Whether this plant is built in Belene or not is not so important; what is more important is the question of reaching a final decision on it. In any case, the problems of the second nuclear plant directly concern our company, and I can even say that under certain intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements these questions have been entrusted exclusively to our company.

[Marinova] Does this mean that Triada is only interested in the nuclear power industry?

[Stefanov] No, we are working very actively in the classical energy industry field—in repair and maintenance work, testing the condition of operating installations by new methods, and the provision of certain deliveries. We also engage in commercial and financial activities; we are trying to find international investors and credit providers for some principal installations in the energy sector.

[Marinova] You said that the company was formed with state capital. Is there not a risk of a state structure duplicating other ones that have been formed and are already functioning?

[Stefanov] All of Triada's capital is state-owned. At the same time, it is completely independent, keeps its own business accounts, and under the existing Commercial Act operates, I would say, like a private company.

[Marinova] Do you intend to have private shareholders?

[Stefanov] Under a decision adopted by the Board of Directors in January 1995, the company is a closed one for the time being. We will discuss future actions at the next shareholders' meeting. I assume that it is logical this matter to figure on the agenda.

[Marinova] When and where will the next general meeting be held?

[Stefanov] We will hold it in Sofia at the start of next year. Our board held its last meeting recently, and

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all the general directors of our Russian and Bulgarian joint stock companies attended the Sofia symposium on reconstructing and modernizing the WWER-440 and WWER-1000 reactors [water-cooled, water-moderated power reactors used at Kozloduy].

[Marinova] Where will you find the money for big investment projects, such as the second nuclear power plant, for example?

[Stefanov] At present we have no such possibilities, and I would even say that we have no intention to finance the projects ourselves, because this is unrealistic. Our aim is to implement a policy in this direction.

[Marinova] Western companies are said to be showing interest in Triada....

[Stefanov] Western firms are perhaps showing interest; I am glad about this, because our company has a wide range of interests and the work that we carry out requires contacts. However, I emphasize that Triada has eight founding organizations and contains no other capital or share participation.

[Marinova] Who may become a shareholder in the near future?

[Stefanov] In principle, other shareholders might also come in. Whether they are Western firms or not, the condition is that they should be able to work in this direction and contribute to solving the tasks facing our company.

[Marinova] What is the company's capital?

[Stefanov] Triada's capital is small. It was founded with a statutory capital of about 5 million leva, but at the moment the company is developing successfully.

[Marinova] What economic results do you expect from your activities this year?

[Stefanov] We have not yet completed our first year, so it is early to give any specific figures, but the chief result is that the company has gained a very good name in the energy industry as a firm that strictly fulfills its contractual obligations as regards both time and quality.

[Marinova] Could you mention some of these contracts?

[Stefanov] Recently we completed diagnostic testing and repair of a transformer at the Chaira Pumped Storage Hydroelectric Power Plant. We are also working at the Varna Thermoelectric Power Plant, both on supplying equipment and on repair work. We have contracts with the Bobov Dol Thermoelectric Power Plant, and are trying to help the NEC with coal deliveries....

[Marinova] From where are you importing the coal?

[Stefanov] We are mainly working on contracts relating to the Ukrainian and Bulgarian import channels, because these are specific types of coal needed for our energy industry. However, this import is very difficult, mainly due to the lack of real offers.

[Marinova] Do you have any interest in importing nuclear fuel and equipment for nuclear power plants?

[Stefanov] Not at the moment. However, I think that it is logical for Triada to have an interest in supplying fuel for the nuclear energy industry. So far, we have not imported equipment for the Kozloduy Nuclear Plant, but through barter deals we are helping to pay for supplies of spares and equipment both for Kozloduy and for certain thermal power plants.

**Kozloduy No 1 Reactor Reconnected to Grid**

*AU0612104995 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 6 Dec 95*

[Report by correspondent Veronika Pantaleeva]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last night, the No. 1 Reactor Unit at the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant was reconnected to the national electricity grid, after the reactor was shut down yesterday because of a false alarm signal from the protection system.

Since this morning, the No. 1 unit has been operating at 75 percent of its capacity, and its output will be increased to 95 percent before the end of the day.

The 1,000-megawatt No. 5 Reactor Unit is operating at its minimum controllable output. The No. 4 Reactor is shut down for planned maintenance, while the Nos. 1, 3, and 6 Reactors are working at maximum power.

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**Klaus: U.S. Appreciates Contribution to Bosnia**

*LD0512130795 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1200 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The United States appreciates our government's decision to send troops to Bosnia, it was learned during the talks between Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus and representatives of the Clinton administration. Our prime minister told Czech Radio the following on this subject:

[Begin Klaus recording] The U.S. Government genuinely appreciates the step we have taken. That is not just a platitude. It is something they say absolutely spontaneously and absolutely honestly. I also know that this is no trifling matter, and we made this decision as a grave and serious one. Everyone realizes that this operation gives hope for the first year. In that year, we will either succeed or not in getting the opposing sides in the former Yugoslavia and Bosnia to sit at the negotiating table and resolve the situation in the way that, for example, we did in the division of Czechoslovakia. That is what the principal Bosnia debate is about. Then there is the debate about what will follow, what hope is offered by the arrangement of a future unified Bosnia, and what the arrangement will lead to. [end recording]

**Survey Shows Opinions on NATO Membership**

*AU0512142295 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 30 Nov 95 p 2*

[Article by "jik": "Surveys Show That the Number of Opponents of Joining the North Atlantic Alliance Is Growing"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Although the majority of people still support the entry of the Republic into the North Atlantic alliance, the number of its opponents is growing constantly. In a recent survey by the Institute for Public Opinion Research [IVVM], 46 percent of those interested in this issue answered that the Republic should endeavor to join NATO. On the other hand, 39 percent disagree with it, and another 16 percent do not hold a firm view on the issue.

The number of opponents of joining NATO rose in comparison to the previous IVVM polls precisely to the detriment of those who could not clearly state their view. Still this year, for instance, 31 percent of those who stated a view rejected entry into NATO—it was 28 percent a year ago and 26 percent two years ago. At that time, 10 percent more people could not express their view.

The number of those in favor of joining has been almost stable since November 1993. Only a year ago, 42 percent were in favor of entry, the same as in May 1992. The number of opponents dominated over the supporters of entry only in the first poll that IVVM conducted on the topic in October 1991. At that time, 39 percent of the respondents were in favor, and 1 percent more were opposed.

At present, support for NATO entry increases with the level of education of those asked and with their declining age. "According to political party affiliation, 65 percent of Civic Democratic Party supporters would agree with joining NATO, 28 percent of Czech Social Democratic Party supporters, and 6 percent of Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia supporters," Jan Misovic of the IVVM said.

An absolute majority of people, including those in favor of the Republic joining the alliance, however, unanimously reject the idea that nuclear arms should be deployed on the territory of the Republic in the future, after joining NATO. Only 15 out of 100 people would agree to that. On the other hand, 75 percent disagree with it, and 55 percent of them definitely disagree.

**Deputy Minister on NATO Cooperation With Poles**

*AU0512164395 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 2 Dec 95 p 3*

[Report by CTK: "Talks About NATO"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following a meeting with his Polish counterpart, Stefan Meller, Deputy Foreign Minister A. Vondra yesterday emphasized the importance of Czech-Polish relations next year with regard to the integration of the two states into NATO. "Czech-Polish relations are important in this, and we agreed that we will cooperate next year, which may be sui generis crucial from the point of view of the alliance's internal decisionmaking," said Vondra yesterday. According to him, they both concurred in the view that it is necessary to conclude many bilateral agreements next year, agreements that will facilitate border contacts between Polish and Czech citizens.

**Defense Official on Talks With Russian Generals**

*AU0612072395 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 2 Dec 95 p 2*

[Report by "gag": "The Army Holds Talks With Russian Generals"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Czech Army is the only postcommunist army that holds regular talks with the top brass of the Russian military. Several times a year, the Defense Ministries inform each other in staff meetings of changes in the armies and opinions on security in Central Europe, despite Russian generals being among the hardest opponents of NATO expansion.

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Jaromir Novotny, director general of Foreign Relations at the Defense Ministry, explains the staff meetings with Russian generals by the endeavors on the part of the department to talk with all countries that have an impact on European security. "The talks are very tough but fair," Novotny claims. According to him, the Russian soldiers think and act directly and do not cloak their views in phrases.

Novotny says about the Russian generals that they are organizationally very capable and the least corrupt group of people, who well know that NATO does not represent a threat to their country. Nevertheless, the soldiers are playing the hand with an external scarecrow in an attempt to unite the disintegrated Russia.

Novotny believes that the Russian generals approach the Czech Republic as an equal partner. The only disdain they show is for a dearth of clarity in views. "They have contempt for such people and act with them accordingly," Novotny characterizes Russian generals.

**Klaus Discusses Coalition, Calfa, Deficit**

*AU0612075895 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 1 Dec 95 p 3*

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Eva Martinkova in Prague on 30 November: "Let Us Not Lose All of 1996 Because of the Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The regular interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus concerns the coalition, Marian Calfa, and the billion [currency not specified] deficit in foreign trade with the Czech Republic.

[Martinkova] Once again, the coalition could not reach an agreement. Was it a simple matter of the actual date for the Senate elections, or does it testify to the difficult situation within the coalition?

[Klaus] I do not believe it is a matter of difficult communication. The four parties of the coalition communicate with one another in a friendly and peaceful manner. It truly is a matter-of-fact difference in opinions. This difference has nothing to do with a general assessment of the Senate institution but, rather, reflects the interests of the individual parties. It is absolutely legitimate for several perceptions of one problem to differ. I am mostly concerned with the issue of two elections, the question of cost, both financial and human, which must be invested. In fact, two elections could mean a loss of the entire 1996 in preelectoral concessions and caution, while it is necessary that the state policy continue in the standard manner.

[Martinkova] Your coalition partners commented after the meeting to the effect that they expected a more accommodating attitude from the Civic Democratic Party.

[Klaus] I would describe this as amusing because a simple symmetry of human relations would command that I say I expected a more accommodating attitude from them.

[Martinkova] It seemed on the TV screen on 26 November that you get along very well with former Prime Minister Calfa.

[Klaus] I have never concealed that my relations with Marian Calfa during the 30 months in the federal government were in order, and I have said many times that he was probably the only one of all of the members of the government who most supported the steps I proposed. During the following three and a half years, I met Calfa about twice for 10 minutes. Nonetheless, our 60-minute meeting on the TV screen demonstrated that we can discuss the tabled topics in a similar tone and in a similar style.

[Martinkova] Would you welcome his return to politics?

[Klaus] Politicians do not return to politics as individual beings but rather as representatives of various currents, moreover anchored in some political party. The political orientation of Marian Calfa, if any, is a secret to me.

[Martinkova] It certainly did not look as if he were oriented toward the Czech Social Democratic Party.

[Klaus] Yes, I had the same impression.

[Martinkova] The deficit in foreign trade increased almost in a leap. Is it serious with our exports?

[Klaus] I would not say it was a leap. There are many phenomena of a seasonal character. There is a lot of Christmas stuff bought several months in advance, and I would not be surprised if the November and December figurers were different. I would not draw any conclusions from the October data alone. Yes, it is one clear problem of our economy. It is one figure that I would put on the liabilities side, but it is a part of the system.

**Interim Depository for Spent Fuel Inaugurated**

*LD0512185895 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The first nuclear fuel container took up its position today in the interim depository for spent fuel at the Dukovany nuclear power station. Pavel Kovar is on the line from Czech radio's Brno studio:

[Kovar] This afternoon the Czech Republic definitively became a country that stores spent nuclear fuel. The

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interim depository at Dukovany became operational just in time because, despite the plant's having increased the capacity of the cassettes containing spent fuel in the storage pools by 60 percent over the past three years, it would have had to shut down the third reactor in February on account of there being no further storage space for spent fuel.

Today thus saw the opening of the interim depository for a one-year experimental period. The Castor 440 container was sealed by two commissioners from the International Atomic Energy Agency, one Austrian and one Japanese. The container had been waiting to be filled with fuel since 19 November pending transit permission from the State Nuclear Safety Authority. The Dukovany plant wants to put a second full container into the interim depository by Christmas. The depository is designed to take 600 tonnes of spent fuel—in other words, 60 containers—and it is expected to be full by the year 2005.

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**Republic Said To Recognize FRY as SFRY Successor**

*AU0512131195 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 4 Dec 95 p 1*

[Report by TASR: "Slovakia Recognizes the Continuity of Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The Slovak Republic recognizes the continuity, under international law, of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as the successor state to the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) and is ready to confirm the validity of the existing contractual legal basis, which comprises 31 bilateral contractual documents.

The above information comes from diplomatic sources of the FRY Embassy in Bratislava, which allegedly obtained the Slovak side's approval regarding maintaining the validity of treaties and agreements concluded between the former CSFR and SFRY. The international law departments of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in Bratislava and Belgrade have been charged with an overall revision of the bilateral contractual legal basis.

**Text of National Council Law on State Language**

*AU0612075495 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 1 Dec 95 p 9*

[Text of the "National Council Law on the State Language of the Slovak Republic" approved by the NR SR in Bratislava on 15 November 1995]

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR], proceeding from the fact that the Slovak language is the most important symbol of the individuality of the Slovak nation, the most valuable asset of its cultural heritage, and a manifestation of the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic and the general means of communication among its citizens that guarantees their freedom and equality in self-esteem and rights (1) on the territory of the Slovak Republic, has decreed the following in this law approved on 15 November 1995:

**Article 1**

**Introductory Ordinance**

1. The state language on the territory of the Slovak Republic is the Slovak language (2).

2. The state language has precedence over all the other languages used on the territory of the Slovak Republic.

3. The law does not regulate the use of the liturgical languages. The use of these languages is regulated by the guidelines issued by the churches and religious organizations (3).

4. The law does not regulate the use of the languages of the ethnic minorities and ethnic groups. The use of these languages is regulated by special laws (4).

**Article 2**

**The State Language and Its Protection**

1. The state

a) will create conditions in the educational, scientific, and information systems that ensure that each citizen of the Slovak Republic can embrace and use the state language orally and in writing;

b) will provide for the scientific study of the state language, its historical development, the study of local and social dialects, the codification of the state language, and the promotion of linguistic culture.

2. The Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic (henceforth just "Culture Ministry") will promulgate the codified form of the state language as suggested by the specialist Slovak linguistic institutions.

3. Any change in the codified form of the state language at variance with its accepted structures is inadmissible.

**Article 3**

**Use of the State Language in Official Contacts**

1. State bodies and state organizations, territorial self-administration bodies and the bodies of public service institutions (henceforth just "public service body"), in executing their functions, are obliged to use the state language throughout the territory of the Slovak Republic. Furnishing proof of an adequate command of the state language orally and in writing is a condition for acceptance into employment or into a similar work relationship and is a prerequisite for carrying out the work agreed upon in a job assignment in a public service body.

2. Employees and functionaries of public service bodies, transportation and communications employees, and members of the Armed Forces, the armed security corps, other armed corps, and fire-fighting units are to use the state language in official contacts.

3. a) Laws, government decrees, and other generally binding legal ordinances, including the ordinances of territorial self-administration bodies, decisions, and other public documents, are to be issued in the state language;

b) Talks involving public service bodies are to be carried out in the state language;

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c) All official information (registers, minutes, resolutions, statistics, files, balances, official records, information intended for the public, and so on) and information issued by the churches and religious organizations intended for the public is to be kept in the state language;

d) The official names of communities and their environs, the names of streets and other public areas, other geographical names, and information on state maps, including community maps, are to be rendered in the state language. The designation of communities in other languages is regulated by a special law (6);

e) Community records are to be kept in the state language. The possible version in another language is to be a translation from the state language.

4. Public service bodies and the organizations run by them are obliged to use the state language in all information systems and in contacts with one another.

5. Written submissions from citizens intended for public service bodies are to be submitted in the state language.

6. Each citizen of the Slovak Republic has the right to adjust his name (7) and surname free of charge to the Slovak orthographical form.

**Article 4**

**Use of the State Language in Education**

1. Teaching of the state language is mandatory in all elementary and high schools. A language other than the state language is the language of instruction and examination to the extent stipulated by special provisions (8).

2. Teaching staffs in all schools and educational facilities on the territory of the Slovak Republic, with the exception of foreign teachers and lecturers, are obliged to master and use the state language orally and in writing.

3. All teaching material is to be rendered in the state language.

4. Textbooks and educational texts used in the education process in the Slovak Republic are to be issued in the state language, except for the textbooks and educational texts used for teaching in the language of the ethnic minorities and ethnic groups and for teaching other foreign languages. Their issue and use are regulated by special provisions (9).

5. The stipulations outlined in Paragraphs 1, 2, and 4 do not relate to the use of the state language in teaching at the universities, in the teaching of other languages, or in upbringing and education in a language other than the state language (8) or to the use of textbooks and educational texts needed for teaching at the universities.

**Article 5**

**Use of the State Language in the Mass Information Media, at Cultural Events, and at Public Assemblies**

1. Broadcasting on radio and television throughout the territory of the Slovak Republic is to be carried out in the state language. The exceptions are:

a) foreign-language radio programs and foreign-language television programs consisting of audiovisual presentations and other recordings with subtitles in the state language or programs otherwise meeting the condition of basic comprehensibility in terms of the state language;

b) Slovak Radio foreign-language broadcasts for foreign countries, television and radio language courses, and programs with a related orientation;

c) musical programs with the original texts.

Broadcasts in the languages of the ethnic minorities and ethnic groups are regulated by special provisions (10).

2. Foreign-language audiovisual programs intended for children under age 12 must be dubbed into the state language.

3. The operators of radio and television broadcasts, announcers, commentators, and editors are obliged to use the state language in broadcasts.

4. Broadcasting by regional or local television channels and radio stations and radio facilities is to be carried out principally in the state language. Other languages may be used before the transmission and following the transmission of the given program in the state language.

5. Periodical publications and nonperiodical publications are to be issued in the state language. The publication of the foreign-language press is regulated by a special provision (11).

6. Occasional press intended for the public—gallery, museum, and library catalogs; cinema, theater, and concert programs; and programs for other cultural events—are to be published in the state language. If necessary, they may contain translations into foreign languages.

7. Cultural and educational events are to be carried out in the state language or in another language if they meet the condition of basic comprehensibility in terms of the state language. Cultural events involving the ethnic minorities, ethnic groups, foreign guest artists, and musical programs with the original texts are the exceptions. The

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accompanying commentary (presentation) for programs is to be made in the state language first.

8. Each participant in an assembly or lecture on the territory of the Slovak Republic has the right to make his speech in the state language.

**Article 6**

**Use of the State Language in the Armed Forces, the Armed Corps, and the Fire-Fighting Units**

1. In the Army of the Slovak Republic, the Slovak Interior Ministry forces, the Police Corps, the Slovak Information Service, the Prison Corps and Judicial Guard of the Slovak Republic, the Railroad Police of the Slovak Republic, and community police corps, the state language is to be used in official contacts.

2. All information and documentation for the Armed Forces, the armed security corps, other armed units, and the fire-fighting units are to be rendered in the state language.

3. The stipulation outlined in Paragraph 1 does not relate to the Air Force during flight operations or to international activities involving the armed corps.

**Article 7**

**Use of the State Language in Court and Administrative Proceedings**

1. Contacts between the courts and citizens, court proceedings, administrative proceedings, and the decisions and records of courts and administrative bodies are to be conducted and issued in the state language.

2. The rights of persons belonging to the ethnic minorities and ethnic groups or the rights of foreigners who do not speak the state language remain unaffected in accordance with the special provisions (12).

**Article 8**

**Use of the State Language in the Economy, in Services, and in Health Care**

1. In the interest of protecting the consumer, the use of the state language is mandatory in describing the contents of domestic or imported goods; in the instructions for using products, especially foodstuffs and medicines; in warranty conditions; and in other consumer information (13).

2. Written legal actions in employment-related legal relations or in similar employment relations are to be prepared in the state language.

3. Financial and technical documentation, Slovak technical norms, and the articles of associations, organizations, political parties, political movements, and commercial companies are to be prepared in the state language.

4. All information pertaining to health-care facilities is to be rendered in the state language. Communication between health-care staff and patients is, as a rule, to be carried out in the state language. If a citizen or a foreigner who does not speak the state language is involved, it may also be carried out in a language in which it is possible to confer with the patient.

5. In proceedings before public service bodies on agreements regulating binding relations, only the version in the state language is recognized.

6. All signs, advertisements, and announcements intended to inform the public—especially in stores, sports grounds, restaurants; on the streets; alongside roads and above them; at airports, bus, and railroad stations; in vehicles; and on mass transportation—must be rendered in the state language. They may be translated into other languages, but the foreign-language texts are to come after the text in the state language, whose lettering is rendered in the same size.

**Article 9**

**Supervision**

The Culture Ministry will supervise adherence to the obligations arising from this law. If it encounters any shortcomings, it will point them out to the legal and physical persons in whose activities it has encountered these shortcomings and is entitled to demand that the unlawful situation be eradicated.

**Article 10**

**Fines**

1. If an unlawful situation is not eradicated (Article 9), the Culture Ministry can impose a fine of

a) up to 250,000 korunas [Sk] on legal persons for infringing the obligations outlined in Article 4, Paragraph 4 and Article 8, Paragraphs 1, 3, 5, and 6;

b) up to Sk500,000 on legal persons for infringing the obligations outlined in Article 5, Paragraphs 2 and 4;

c) up to Sk50,000 on physical persons licensed to conduct business for infringing their obligations in accordance with Article 4, Paragraph 4; Article 5, Paragraphs 2 and 4; and Article 8, Paragraphs 1, 3, and 5.

2. In determining a fine, the Culture Ministry will take into consideration the serious nature of the obligations infringed.

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3. A fine can be imposed within one year, at the latest, from the day the Culture Ministry comes across an infringed obligation but, within three years, at the latest, from the infringement of the obligation.

4. A fine imposed in accordance with this law is payable within 30 days from the day the decision by which it was imposed comes into effect. The general provisions on administrative proceedings (14) are to be related to the procedure for imposing a fine.

5. The fines imposed in accordance with this law are the revenue of the Pro Slovakia state culture fund (15).

**Article 11**

**General and Temporary Stipulations**

1. The use of common foreign-language names, specialist concepts, or the designation of new facts for which there is not yet a suitable equal expression in the state language is not affected by this law.

2. The heads of public service bodies and other legal persons and physical persons (Article 10, Paragraph 1) are responsible for adherence to the stipulations outlined in this law.

3. The costs for all of the changes made to signboards, notices, and other texts in accordance with this law are to be met by the appropriate authorities and other physical and legal persons. These changes are to be made within one year from the day this law comes into effect.

4. The state language for the purposes of Article 2, Paragraph 1, Letters a) and b); Article 3, Paragraphs 1, and 2, and Paragraph 3, Letters a), c), d), and e); Article 4; Article 5, Paragraphs 5 and 8; Article 6, Paragraph 2; and Article 8, Paragraphs 1-5 is understood to be the Slovak language in its codified form (Article 2, Paragraph 2).

**Article 12**

**Stipulation of Annulment**

Slovak National Council [SNR] Law No. 428/1990, published in the Legal Gazette [Zb] on the official language in the Slovak Republic, is annulled.

**Article 13**

This law will come into effect on 1 January 1996, except Article 10, which will come into effect on 1 January 1997.

* * *

**Explanatory Notes (References)**

(1) Article 12, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.

(2) Article 6, Paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.

(3) Law No. 308/1991 Zb on freedom of religion and the status of the churches and religious organizations.

(4) For example, Law No. 141/1961 Zb on criminal court proceedings (Penal Code) as rendered in later provisions; the Civil Court Code; Law No. 81/1966 Zb on the periodical press and the other mass information media as rendered in later provisions; Law No. 29/1984 Zb on the system of elementary and high schools (education law) as rendered in later provisions; SNR Law No. 254/1991 Zb on Slovak Television as rendered in later provisions; SNR Law No. 255/1991 Zb on Slovak Radio as rendered in later provisions; NR SR Law No. 191/1994 published in the Zbierka zakonov [Zz] on the designation of communities in the language of the ethnic minorities.

(5) For example, SNR Law No. 254/1991 Zb as rendered in later provisions; SNR Law No. 255/1991 Zb as rendered in later provisions; NR SR Law No. 273/1994 Zz on health insurance, financing health insurance, on establishing Vseobecna zdravotna poistovna [General Health Insurance Company], and on establishing departmental, branch, enterprise, and civil health insurance companies as rendered in later provisions; NR SR Law No. 274/1994 Zz on Social Insurance as rendered in later provisions.

(6) NR SR Law No. 191/1994 Zz.

(7) Article 7, Paragraph 1 of NR SR Law No. 300/1993 Zz on names and surnames.

(8) Articles 3 and 3a of Law No. 29/1984 Zb as rendered in Law No. 171/1990 Zb and NR SR Law No. 230/1994 Zz.

(9) Article 40 of Law No. 29/1984 Zb as rendered in later provisions.

Slovak Republic Government Decree No. 282/1994 Zz on the use of textbooks and educational texts.

(10) Article 3 Paragraph 3 of SNR Law No. 254/1991 Zb as rendered in later provisions.

Article 5 of SNR Law No. 255/1991 Zb as rendered in later provisions.

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(11) Law No. 81/1966 Zb on the periodical press and the other mass information media as rendered in later provisions.

(12) Article 18 of the Civil Court Code.

Article 2, Paragraph 14 of Law No. 141/1961 Zb on criminal court proceedings (Penal Code).

Law No. 36/1967 Zb on experts and interpreters.

Slovak Republic Justice Ministry Decree No. 37/1967 Zb on executing the law on experts and interpreters as rendered in later provisions.

(13) Article 9, Paragraphs 1 and 2, and Article 11 of Law No. 634/1992 Zb on consumer protection.

NR SR Law No. 152/1995 Zz on foodstuffs.

(14) Law No. 71/1967 Zb on administrative proceedings (administrative code).

(15) SNR Law No. 95/1991 Zb on the Pro Slovakia state culture fund as rendered in later provisions.

**Official Rejects Language Law Criticism**

*AU0512145395 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 2 Dec 95 p 7*

[Report by TASR: "Jozef Sestak: Why Are We Permanently Exposed to Pressure? What Have We Done to Anyone?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna—By approving the much-criticized law on the state language of the Slovak Republic, we did not decide on the fate of the 11-percent Hungarian minority, but on the 90-percent majority. We believe that 90 percent of citizens take precedence over 10 percent, Jozef Sestak, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, told the Austrian APA press agency in an interview in Vienna on the evening of 30 November.

According to Sestak, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia is thriving and enjoys a higher standard of living than the citizens of Hungary, but its representatives have "very strange ambitions." Jozef Sestak vigorously refused to accept collective rights of ethnic minorities because this would mean "the end of Europe."

The state secretary refused to comment on the fact that proceeds from the fines imposed for violations of the language law will flow into the Pro-Slovakia Fund. The fines are, however, necessary, he said, if for no other reason than that food is being manufactured in Slovakia, on the packaging of which you will find only Hungarian inscriptions, or because, in communities with a Hungarian majority, public announcements are being posted only in the Hungarian language. This cannot go on, Sestak stressed.

Explaining why legal provisions regulating the use of the languages of ethnic minorities were not adopted simultaneously with the new language law, Sestak cited the large number of laws that the young Slovak Republic must pass. However, Prime Minister Meciar's government should discuss the appropriate regulations in the first or second quarter of next year.

According to Jozef Sestak, Slovakia's critics forget that the task of international standards and norms is to protect an ethnic minority so that it can preserve its national, cultural, and historical identity, but not to satisfy the political ambitions of the minority. At the same time, he warned against "swallowing the bait" of Hungarian minority representatives' arguments. "Why are we permanently exposed to pressure? What have we done to anyone? We want to live in peace in our own state. So let us keep that right," Sestak said at the close of the interview.

**Duray Explains Absence From Treaty Process**

*AU0612123795 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 2 Dec 95 p 8*

[Interview with Coexistence Movement Chairman Miklos Duray by Ferenc Garzo; place and date not given: "The Hungarians Will Be Absent From the Ratification Process"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Miklos Duray, chairman of the Coexistence Movement, the biggest movement of Hungarians living in Slovakia, has previously stated: If the Bratislava legislative body accepts the language law, it will be pointless for Slovakia's Hungarian politicians to participate in the ratification process of the Slovak-Hungarian bilateral treaty. What does this absence mean in practice, and how does it fit into the Hungarian Coalition's strategy with which it tries to fight the Slovak measures afflicting the Hungarian minority, we asked Duray.

[Duray] The basic treaty has a section that, on the basis of the Slovak interpretation, could be turned completely against the Hungarians living here; it states that the basic treaty must be implemented in accordance with the domestic legal systems of the treaty partners. According to the Slovaks, this means that laws may be passed that limit or curtail the basic treaty.

[Garzo] In the past, you have often mentioned that a certain legal duality had evolved in Slovakia, that the laws often contradict each other. Is that the reason you wish to stay away from the ratification process?

[Duray] The fact that the basic treaty is not interpreted in Slovakia in accordance with the Vienna convention in itself creates a dual legal system in this country. The con-

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vention on international agreements is also mandatory for Slovakia because it is a successor state of the former Czechoslovakia, which signed this document. Actually, Slovak politics uses the basic treaty to legitimize the deteriorating situation. This is the reason we do not wish to participate in the ratification process.

[Garzo] How would this absence happen in practice? Will the Hungarian deputies be absent from parliament during the debate and the voting?

[Duray] That is unimportant because it is not the debate that decides the matter. Actually, there are a number of possibilities. We can be present at the voting but need not vote and can abstain. It is also possible that the deputy presses the presence indicator on the voting machine, but not the voting button.

[Garzo] This means that you do not wish to use any arguments in the debate....

[Duray] The debate on the international agreement is futile because nothing can now be amended. There is no point in trying to convince each other because this is unlikely to change people's conflicting views in a parliamentary debate.

[Garzo] Have you discussed all this with representatives of the Hungarian Government?

[Duray] We have not discussed this particular issue, but, when Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn and Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs recently received representatives of the Hungarian Coalition, they mentioned that they would consider it important for the Hungarian Coalition to vote in favor of the basic treaty. At the same time, it must be remembered that, at the time of our Budapest talks, Prime Minister Meciar said: If the Hungarian Government takes measures against the language law, the ratification of the basic treaty can be delayed in Slovakia, even though the government coalition is ready to vote in favor of it. In our view, this way, the ratification of the basic treaty has become part of a strange game, and, rather than following the original intention, it is lifted out of the legal environment and appears as a kind of political demonstration.

**Witness in Kovac Jr Case Intimidated by Grenades**

*AU0612074195 Bratislava SME in Slovak 30 Nov 95 p 1*

[Article by "pt": "Witnesses in Michal Kovac Jr. Case Intimidated by Grenades"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Cicov—SME and Radio Free Europe correspondents yesterday met with Jan V., a secret witness in the case of Michal Kovac Jr., who testified several times before P. Vacok [former chief investigator of the case] and on Tuesday, 28 November, was questioned also by J. Ciz [current investigator]. Jan V. told us that, during his interrogation by J. Ciz, he insisted on his previous testimonies made before P. Vacok. When we asked whether Jan V. is the witness who refused to give Oskar F. [former Slovak Information Service agent who confessed his part in the kidnapping] a false alibi for the white Mercedes 208 D van, he said: "I cannot confirm this, but I am not going to deny it, either." Jan V. told us further that, on 14 November 1995 at 0600, five roll-shaped pieces, looking like an explosive, were found near the house where he lives, with carpet tape pasted over them and a detonating fuse sticking out. The charge, which looked like danubit [presumably type of explosive], did not explode, however. The same day, the residents of Cicov observed an unknown car of Western make driving around the village. "On 17 November 1995 at 0100, I was awakened by a strong blast," Jan V. said. That night, unidentified perpetrators threw two grenades under his windows. The explosion damaged the plaster and a concrete wall in front of the house and destroyed the window ledges and the venetian blinds. All of the house's windows were shattered. The heat generated by the explosion of one of the grenades melted a 3-millimeter steel wire for holding the ivy. It is worth noting that public lighting tends to be switched off in Cicov between 0100 and 0300. The perpetrators most likely threw the grenades with the street lights switched on but escaped in the dark. A witness from Cicov saw a white Skoda-Favorit twice encircling Jan V.'s house. As he was going round the second time, the explosion was heard, and 20 seconds later the white Favorit dashed away in the direction of Travnik. Jan V. expressed concern over the mafia-type reactions by people affected by his testimony and added: "I testified because I considered it my duty as a citizen to announce to the investigators facts that might be connected with Michal Kovac Jr.'s abduction."

**DU: STV May Be Instrument of 'Intelligence Game'**

*AU0512085395 Bratislava SME in Slovak 30 Nov 95 p 2*

[Report by "bog": "Democratic Union: Slovak Television's Stand Demonstrates One-Sidedness"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Democratic Union [DU] protests against the discriminatory course of action by the management of Slovak Television [STV], which granted Jozef Hlavac, a former DU member, space for accusations of the present DU leadership in the main evening news program on Monday, 27 November, but rejected DU Chairman Jozef Moravcik's request to respond to those accusations, DU Press Secretary

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G. Nemkyova told SME. She also delivered to us a statement by DU Deputy Chairman Jan Budaj, which states that STV provided space for Jozef Hlavac, who is not a DU member, to appear on television screens under the DU's logo and to comment on its internal issues. He informed the public about his dissatisfaction with DU's policies and claimed that an initiative group exists within DU with different views, particularly on cooperation with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]. [passage omitted] "Jozef Hlavac was a DU district functionary in the past, but the Spisska Nova Ves DU District Council had reservations about his work, particularly his handling of financial funds, and proposed his expulsion. Later the DU district council informed us that Mr. Hlavac had recently been seen in the company of Mr. Chilo-Ptak, protagonist of the events surrounding the abduction of Michal Kovac Jr., which puts his appearance on television into a completely different light. It cannot be ruled out that STV has become the instrument of an intelligence game. [passage omitted] We assess the STV management's stand as a demonstration of its one-sidedness and readiness to serve HZDS interests. We insist on the STV's observance of the law on the STV as a public service corporation," Jan Budaj stated.

**Supreme Court Rules Minister Violated Law**

*AU0512164595 Bratislava SME in Slovak 1 Dec 95 p 1*

[Report by "so": "Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic Restored to PSIS the Permit To Operate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—Prva Slovenska Investicna Spolocnost [First Slovak Investment Company] (PSIS) yesterday received the verdict of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, which cancels the decision of the minister of finance of 8 June 1995, as well as the decision of the Ministry of Finance of 31 March 1995, signed by State Secretary Jozef Magula, and restores to the PSIS the permit to operate. The PSIS will again take over the administration of its three funds—Sporofond, Vseobecny Investicny Fond [General Investment Fund], and Slovensky Majetkovy Fond [Slovak Property Fund]—which the Ministry of Finance had placed under the forced administration of Harvardska Investicna Spolocnost [Harvard Investment Company]. The PSIS sued the Ministry of Finance on 21 July and asked the Supreme Court to examine the lawfulness of the finance minister's decision to withdraw the PSIS's license. According to the verdict of the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic, against which the Ministry of Finance cannot appeal, the withdrawal of the license was not based on law. In the verdict it is literally stated that facts from audits underlying the imposition of sanctions cannot be used to impose new sanctions. Regarding facts that the Ministry of Finance claimed were serious shortcomings, owing to which it withdrew the PSIS license, the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic stated that these had no backing in the law. In many instances, the findings and sanctions were not backed by established facts and evidence, proceeded merely from the Finance Ministry's reasoning, and were frequently incomprehensible, and it was not clear on the basis of which legal foundations they were meted out.

[On the same day, on page 1, Bratislava SME in Slovak carries a 600-word interview with PSIS Director Igor Duric by Svetlana Kolesarova, in which Duric hails the Supreme Court decision as "victory for the citizens of Slovakia" and "confirmation that the Slovak Republic really has all the prerequisites to be a law-governed state with a functioning judiciary." According to Duric, "It has been confirmed that the steps the PSIS took on behalf of all of its clients in previous years were in accordance with the law and that the defamation of our company was not based on truth." The PSIS director points out that the fund has suffered damage because it could not dispose of its property for eight months and because more than 30 percent of Sporofond shareholders have asked to buy back their shares "because they were dissatisfied with the imposed administrator." Duric indicates that his company may seek redress from the Ministry of Finance when he announces that the PSIS will now "analyze the implications and opportunities that the Supreme Court verdict has opened for us."]

**Journalist Discloses Censorship on TV**

*AU0612080095 Bratislava SME in Slovak 1 Dec 95 p 3*

[Report by "eb": "According to Kosice STV Studio Minutes, Censorship of the Grossest Kind Manifested Itself During the President's Visit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Kosice—"It was an internal paper that I wrote for the needs of Slovak Television [STV], and I have no idea how it got out," Ivan Janda, editor of the Kosice STV studio's news team, told SME yesterday. The paper, which contains minutes from a working meeting in the Kosice STV studio, sharply criticizes the course of action by Dusan Koncek, director of the Kosice STV studio. According to the contents of the paper, which the Kosice daily KORZO published this week after it was found lying on a desk in the editorial office, "censorship of the grossest kind" manifested itself during Slovak President Michal Kovac's recent working visit to east Slovakia. "No matter what we may think about our constitutional officials, not informing viewers about their working trips

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is something bordering on demagoguery and rudeness." The paper states that, "during the president's stay, someone forbade the showing of a video clip on the first day of the visit, forbade the processing of recorded material on the second day, and forbade the recording of the third day, which is a matter that should not be dealt with here. it is a problem for the Council for Television and Radio Broadcasting." The paper points out that television viewers were not allowed to be informed about Slovak President Michal Kovac's meeting with the survivors of the victims of the accident in the East Slovak Iron Works, among other things. Asked by SME whether he has come across any objections to his person, editor Ivan Janda said that he does not intend to comment on the affair. He added, however, that he asked to have his contract of employment with STV terminated, without reason, as of 1 January 1996.

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**Keleti Interviewed on U.S. Troop Mission**

*AU0512214195 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 5 Dec 95 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti by Irene Szabo; place and date not given: "This Is Our NATO Test—Keleti: It Is a Guarantee of Peace That the UN Mission Has Power"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the defense minister, it is in our vital interest to have peace in the south Slav region—this is why we would send soldiers to the international mission. Our participation can influence NATO in assessing our admission. According to Keleti, the issue of the technical units cannot lead to friction in the coalition. In connection with the South Slav crisis rather than the distance-keeping Hungarian foreign policy, it is the situation that has changed.

[Szabo] Up to now, Hungarian foreign policy has attempted to keep a distance in connection with the South Slav crisis. However, now we are allowing the U.S. NATO troops to pass through Hungary, we have allowed them to set up supply bases, and we are also sending a 500-strong technical unit to the region. What is the reason for the change in the concept?

[Keleti] Rather than the concept, the situation has changed. All three sides came to an agreement in Dayton and agreed that NATO would control the demarcation lines. With our participation, we are assisting the implementation of a generally accepted peace process, which is our vital interest.

[Szabo] What is the guarantee that we are not attempting an impossible task?

[Keleti] NATO troops will have the right to shoot first. Peacekeeping now has power in its hands, and it is meant to ensure compliance with an accepted agreement.

[Szabo] What justifies our plans to send technical units?

[keleti] Preliminary talks in a conditional sense have been held for months between the army and NATO on sending medical or technical units. In the meantime, the supply of medical units has increased too much, many [countries] had previously offered doctors.

[Szabo] According to a view in military circles, we are sending bridge builders because the Hungarian army has many heavy bridges [nehezhid] left over from Warsaw Pact times. Therefore, bridge building is a task with which we can prove to NATO that....

[Keleti] Yes, with this task we can prove to NATO that we can also be useful participants of an international peace action. It is at least as important that this task is needed and we are able to perform it.

[Szabo] Will the current participation evaluate us when the assessments are made for NATO admission?

[Keleti] In my view, it will by all means be taken into account that we have participated in the action and the work of the troops will also be taken into account. However, I believe that it would have also been taken into account to an even greater extent, but in a different direction, if we had not participated in the international mission.

[Szabo] As far as you know, does the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ], as a coalition party, support the sending of the troops?

[Keleti] As far as I know, its does, on certain conditions.

[Szabo] Is it a condition, for example, that our soldiers should be unarmed?

[Keleti] They will be unarmed. They will only take their self-defense weapons with them. We cannot expect a soldier who happens to work with a shovel to defend himself with a shovel.

[Szabo] Is there a danger that the sending of the technical units will lead to tension in the coalition?

[Keleti] This is completely out of the question. To my knowledge, Imre Mecs, SZDSZ member chairman of the Parliamentary Defense Committee, took a stance in support of sending the units after consultation with SZDSZ Chairman Ivan Peto.

[Szabo] After the six-party consultation on 1 December, do you think that parliament will approve the sending?

[Keleti] On 1 December, only the Smallholders rejected the idea of technical units. The Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party clearly supports it and Imre Konya [Hungarian Democratic Forum, MDF] and Laszlo Surjan [Christian Democratic People's Party, KDNP] also said that neither the MDF nor the KDNP is against the participation.

[Szabo] If parliament says yes at the beginning of the week, how much time is needed to select the unit members?

[Keleti] In my estimation, parliament can make a decision on 5 December, and a subunit can already arrive on the scene in the first days of January. At any rate, I have already asked the Defense Committee to let us carry out the preparatory work in the meantime. Volunteers are not yet being recruited. At the same time, I find it encouraging that two bridge units of the army, namely, the ones in Szeged and Ercs, have indicated

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that many of their reserves had telephoned them that they could be relied on. In order to better serve the subunit, we have also thought of sending hairdressers and army chaplains, for example.

[Szabo] How much pay are the soldiers working there going to get?

[Keleti] Their pay will be set according to the Hungarian army's regulations. We will make a contract with all soldiers who are sent and they will receive their pay in Hungary. While abroad, they can get the daily allowance and supplements, including the one for foreign service, in their hand. Unfortunately, they will no get as much as NATO soldiers do.

[Szabo] What period are the permits of the mission's U.S. soldiers to stay in Hungary, and of the Hungarian technical unit to be placed in Croatia valid for?

[Keleti] The United Nations gave a one-year commission, and the Hungarian parliament's decision is also valid until 31 December 1996. The U.S. soldiers will then have to leave the country and ours will have to return home. It will be a new situation if the mission needs to be continued. In that case, the issue will have to be renegotiated at all international and domestic forums.

[Szabo] As far as we know, a special army committee has been set up to coordinate domestic tasks.

[Keleti] The military coordination cadre has been set up under Lt. General Bela Biro's leadership. The ministry also set up a 40-man logistics group for ensuring smooth supplies for the Americans. Retired Brigadier General Tibor Cserepes is the leader.

[Szabo] Who will bear the cost?

[Keleti] The Americans, naturally. In addition to the rent charged for the Army establishments, we are also charging them for refurbishments.

[Szabo] Will the Americans leave some of their equipment or possibly sell it to us?

[Keleti] What is certain is that they are making the Taszar airport NATO compatible, so they will leave the built-in technology here.

[Szabo] Do we need to make a separate agreement on the legal standing of relations between the U.S. soldiers stationed in Hungary and the Hungarian population?

[Keleti] We do, and the agreement will be signed this week by representatives of the two governments. Although everything cannot be regulated, I am not worried because the Americans have much experience in this area. The Hungarian law will be the guiding line, with some limitations and allowances. They cannot bring cars and families.

[Szabo] When will the troops arrive?

[Keleti] We can expect their arrival from mid-December onward. Before then, the sides still have to sign the peace treaty in Paris. If this is done, the Americans will be here as a Christmas present.

[Szabo] Can NATO look upon the passage of the U.S. troops through Hungary as a test for Russia to see Moscow's reaction?

[Keleti] What I have said many times has recently been proved: Russian political statements against NATO's expansion are meant for domestic political consumption because the presidential elections are coming in Russia. Moscow has not yet objected to our participation in the mission. They are also sending 1,500 soldiers who will actually also be working in the U.S. zone of responsibility.

### Gyarmati Assesses NATO Accession Issues

*AU0612082795 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 2 Dec 95 pp 1, 8*

[Interview with Istvan Gyarmati, head of the Foreign Ministry's NATO Department, by Irene Szabo; place and date not given: "Neutrality Makes Sense If It Is Recognized"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to new information from Brussels diplomatic sources, at the beginning of 1996, NATO will offer to East European countries showing interest that they can officially indicate their intention to join. In Hungary, the years-long debate on yes or no took a new turn when the Workers Party recently collected 140,000 valid signatures to request a referendum on NATO membership. We interviewed Istvan Gyarmati, head of the Foreign Ministry's NATO Department, on the problems that have emerged in connection with this issue.

[Szabo] The political power is less and less divided, while the population is invariably divided on whether we must join NATO. Those against argue that we will give up our newly acquired freedom. What are your views on this?

[Gyarmati] Rather than whether to join, the first question is how we wish to guarantee the country's security. Once we know this, we will know it all—for example, for a long time to come, military equipment will be needed to guarantee security. This cannot be questioned. We can have a debate on what framework the country chooses for maintaining security. Neutrality makes sense if others also recognize it. Neutrality does not

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exist in war, and in peace, a country that has declared itself neutral, has no obligation. No one is interested in its opinion. Therefore, if this form is dropped then we can choose from two possibilities, namely, maintaining a big army or joining some kind of alliance which gives protection.

[Szabo] Hungary cannot even dream about a big army for various reasons.

[Gyarmati] This is the reality. However, all suggestions that reject our NATO membership for financial reasons, saying that it would cost us much, are illogical. It costs even more not to join and, in addition, we will become exposed. It is also illogical to argue that membership would turn the country into a target. Only one thing—namely, a political and military hinterland—can deter aggressive intentions. The problem is that, rather than on NATO membership, the debate in Hungary is over extreme political principles. A NATO member state cannot pursue extreme politics. Therefore, personally I would welcome Hungary's admission into NATO. And another thing: NATO is not the Warsaw Pact and is not identical to the NATO image people have kept from the past.

[Szabo] According to domestic public opinion, joining NATO is solely a military issue, and the Hungarian army is in charge of it. Is this true?

[Gyarmati] It would be good to dispel this misconception. NATO primarily means the defense of the democratic value system. From a military policy point of view, its essence is European integration and the support of modernization processes. It has not yet been decided in the nation states whether to step forward into the 21st century or to turn back to the 19th. For Hungary, too, a possible NATO membership is mainly a question of civic transformation, modernization, and economic development, and the military aspect is fifth-rate. As for the latter, if a country's army is in the kind of technical, moral, and financial state as ours is and its internal conditions have not followed the changes then NATO's assistance is most important in helping to speed up its integration in society.

[Szabo] Domestic writings on meeting NATO's requirements suggest that the biggest problem is our army's outdated armament. Hundreds of billions would be needed to make it satisfy NATO's conditions.

[Gyarmati] Compatibility does not apply to the armament, the type of technical equipment. The identity of political and military concepts is its essence. NATO does not require us to arm ourselves, it puts the emphasis on will and attitude, although modernization is certainly in our own interest.

[Szabo] The Hungarian public is rather disturbed by the fact that NATO membership might involve stationing nuclear weapons in Hungary.

[Gyarmati] There are no nuclear weapons in the majority of the member states, and the number of such countries is growing. It would not make any sense to take such a politically and militarily mistaken step at the time of nuclear armament limitation, and it would be impossible to do this anyway due to the budget restrictions. It is undoubtedly true that NATO has not given up the nuclear weapons and will not do so as they are the highest level tools for its own security. Stationing them in Hungary is a simple question of principle: This means that we do not reject it once and forever. They will not request it from us. Therefore, this polemic is completely hypothetical.

[Szabo] Is it true that in recent weeks, Polish and Czech politicians have announced that their countries will be ready to accept nuclear weapons if they are admitted into NATO?

[Gyarmati] It is true. Hungary will not join this emerging competition.

[Szabo] What are your views on the domestic debate, which sways between two extreme claims: Does NATO need us or not?

[Gyarmati] NATO needs stable, solid, and democratic countries that are capable of cooperation and achieving consensus and do not have ethnic or territorial disputes with other countries. Actually, the latter is a disqualifying reason. In my view, we should be acting instead of arguing. We also will only be needed if we meet the above criteria. NATO has decided on expansion. Its time will come when the internal coordination with Russia and Ukraine is completed. No decision can be expected in 1996, but I think it is possible that they will offer membership to Hungary in 1997. The question is whether we will be able to use this, whether we will become suitable.

[Szabo] According to our information, you are the most likely candidate for OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] general secretary. Who are your opponents? If you are elected, will this be advantageous for Hungary?

[[Gyarmati] The majority of the organization's more than 50 countries support the Hungarian candidate, namely me, as opposed to the Slovak or Polish candidates. No agreement has yet been achieved. Through my election, OSCE would rate Hungary's foreign political performance, and this would be the first time that a Hungarian diplomat is the head of a major European organization. As to advantages, in my view, it would

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be a big mistake for an international official to favor anyone or any country among the member states.

[Szabo] Would your election bring changes in OSCE's work?

[Gyarmati] The human rights office is small but it has many tasks. The organization's legal background is weak and it does not even have a legal adviser. The financial management is bureaucratic. In other words, I would know what needs to be done.

[Szabo] If you are chosen, will you move to Vienna?

[Gyarmati] I will. But even there I will be available for the Hungarian correspondents.

**Muslim Refugees Still Arriving in Republic**

*LD0612121695 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1100 GMT 6 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] New refugees have been arriving in Hungary from the Yugoslav region, despite the Dayton peace agreement. Over the past few days the refugee camp of Nagyatad has received 35 new refugees, camp director Lajos Horvath told Hungarian radio.

According to refugees who were forced to leave Banja Luka, a new refugee wave can be expected, because the authorities in the city's districts qualified to be Serb districts have called on the Muslims to leave their home. Serb armed men break into the homes of Bosnian families and give them only five minutes to leave. The newly arrived refugees from Banja Luka claim that to emphasize their demand, the Serbs kill one Muslim every night and leave the body on the street.

**Prime Minister Views Economic Path Forward**

*LD0612142395 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1200 GMT 6 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Gyula Horn, the decisive phase in the reform of the state housekeeping can only start in two years' time. The prime minister is confident that next year will see the conclusion of the difficult phase of stabilization, privatization will end, and cooperation between the parliamentary parties will significantly improve. Gyula Horn affirmed that from January [1996] they will set up an economic policy work group within the prime minister's office. A strategic work committee is also expected to be set up to prepare for EU accession.

The prime minister, speaking to journalists, said it was a big achievement that his party [Hungarian Socialist Party—MSZP] in parliament had voted for the 48 percent [higher] tax rate.

Speaking about the situation of the coalition, the prime minister said it had significantly strengthened of late.

Gyula Horn does not intend to change the composition of his government before the end of the parliamentary term [spring 1998].

**Orban Comments on National Minority Policy**

*AU0512141295 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 2 Dec 95 pp 1, 3*

[Interview with Viktor Orban, chairman of the National Assembly's European Integration Committee, by "udvardy"; place and date not given: "Orban on the Foreign Ministerial Attack—The Fruit of a Guilty Conscience"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In recent days, Viktor Orban, chairman of parliament's European Integration Committee [and chairman of the Federation of Young Democrats-Hungarian Civic Party], has been sharply criticized by, among others, the Foreign Ministry for having requested the opinion of Hans van der Broek, EU Commission leader in charge of foreign relations, on the Slovak language law. Orban gave an interview for UJ MAGYARORSZAG on this issue.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Your "deviating" action in Brussels has been sharply criticized.

[Orban] We should at last break with the Kadar [former communist leader]-type national minority policy that is based on the notion that the problems we do not talk about do not exist—namely, with the practice that we do not speak up in the West about the violations against the Hungarian minorities. I cannot go along with the 1990's version of Kadar's national minority policy. As a parliamentary deputy, I feel it is my obligation to raise this issue where and whenever possible, but in all appropriate forms and forums.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] Do you also place Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs's objections in this framework?

[Orban] I actually understand his problems because he has a huge responsibility and he probably does not sleep well. It is his responsibility that he signed a basic treaty that does not contain any kind of guarantees. Now we have this treaty, along which the Slovaks are implementing a series of measures that are unfavorable for the national minority, of which the language law was only the first element. However, once he has this responsibility, he should not try to pass it onto others because he himself, rather than the Hungarian opposition, the integration committee, or its chairman took part in creating this situation. Therefore, he especially cannot pass this responsibility to us who are trying to participate in limiting the damage

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the government caused. It is not by accident that the Hungarians in Romania also feel that they will have the same fate if a basic treaty without guarantees is signed.

[UJ MAGYARORSZAG] According to news leaked after the latest Brussels talks, our integration chances have deteriorated. Do you think this rumor is well founded?

[Orban] A number of unfavorable developments exist regarding Hungarian integration. If we look back to two to three years ago, the dominant view in West Europe and Hungary was that Hungary, as an eminent of the admission process, would be the first to be integrated or among the first. Then it came to light that Hungary is not in the best position, but the Visegrad countries would very probably be taken as a bloc and talks would later be held with the other associated countries. The latest situation is that these talks will be started with every country, the differentiation will be made as a result of talks and, hopefully, the less developed ones will be listed lower down. Therefore, I have to say that the Hungarian expectations have become increasingly more moderate.... The assessments of other countries have improved, while the Hungarian economic growth is the most modest in this region. When analyzing our budget, Western newspapers do not fail to mention that the inflation trend is lower everywhere than here. It is a terrible sight for Western investors that inflation is at 30 percent, along with—possibly—2-percent economic growth.

### Army Retires 11 Generals, Appoints New Leaders

*AU0612083295 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 2 Dec 95 p 4*

[Report by MTI: "Military Leaders Appointed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At the army commanders' conference, the retirement of 11 generals and the transfer and appointment of leaders in connection with the army's reorganization was announced on 1 December. Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti said that this is the first important stage of the army's structural alteration, which also means making it younger. Out of the now appointed 34 leaders, some 21 are below the age of 50, and the retiring generals have reached 55, the upper age limit of military service.

The minister asked the commanders to help the U.S. troops passing through Hungary or temporarily stationed in Hungary to the best of their abilities. He said that Lieutenant General Bela Biro, the now appointed deputy commander of the Hungarian army, has been given the task of coordinating cooperation with the U.S. forces. The 11 retiring generals include Major Gen. Jozsef Feher, administrative state secretary at the Defense Ministry, and deputy state secretaries Lt. Gen. Karoly Janza and Maj. Gen. Csaba Liszkay. However, they will continue their work as civil servants. Keleti and Colonel Gen. Janos Deak, army commander, handed over awards to the leaving generals and thanked for their work. The newly appointed officers include Maj. Gen. Ferenc Vegh, who is the first deputy of the chief of staff from 1 December. He has spent two years studying at NATO's chiefs of staff institution. In military circles, he is said to be the next probable number one military leader.

Brigadier Gen. Attila Kositzky has been assigned the task of air defense commander of the Hungarian army until 15 December because his predecessor, Maj. Gen. Miklos Csurgay, has retired. Kositzky was given the assignment on 1 December. His final appointment can only be expected after 15 December because the army's military reform also affects the air defense command, which in the future will operate as aviation and air defense army corps headquarters.

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**Silajdzic Comments on Dayton Accord, Resignations**

*AU0612124095 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (Europe Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 30 Nov-7 Dec 95 p 7*

[Unattributed report on "exclusive" interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic for B-H PRESS; place and date not given: "Political Injection to the Development of the Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [B-H PRESS] There is no longer any doubt that the Federation is the option favored by the majority of the Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens and the international community.

"Everything depends on the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

"I hope that, after the Dayton Agreement, there will finally be a political will to implement the Federation, since, as far as the document on that is concerned, we signed it in Washington and this document was quite sufficient. There was no political will at that time on the part of some Croat circles." This was stated by Haris Silajdzic, prime minister of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, in an exclusive interview for B-H PRESS, explaining some positive effects of the Dayton Agreement on the establishment of the Federation.

They had been keeping the Herzeg-Bosnia option open until Dayton, but it is quite clear now that we must turn toward the Federation within Bosnia-Herzegovina as there are no longer any dilemma whether that this is the option favored by the majority of the Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens and the international community.

[B-H PRESS] Does this mean that we will have a strong federal government by the end of the year?

[Silajdzic] Yes, we will have a strong federal government that will have power on the entire territory of the Federation.

[B-H PRESS] There is some talk that you could be the head of the new federal government. Is this true?

[Silajdzic] No, I am head of the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and, when the two governments become separated, I will remain head of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[B-H PRESS] When will the government adopt the three most essential laws for the Federation—the laws on the central bank, internal affairs, and defense—which were harmonized almost to the last sentence.

[Silajdzic] Soon!

[B-H PRESS] How realistic are the promises by the IMF and the World Bank that we will soon be admitted to the institutions before others that are in the line and that we will be granted favorable loans?

[Silajdzic] Everything again depends on the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and the urgent dispatch of the Implementation Force. We have learned to take everything with reservations, but I must stress that the intention by the international community to help in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina is evident. I am an optimist regarding this, if the Implementation Force arrives, of course.

[B-H PRESS] The return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes is a very important part of the successful implementation of the Dayton Agreement. How do you see this process?

[Silajdzic] This will be a long and difficult process regardless of the agreement, because it concerns people. Everything to do with the people is complex. There are problems of accommodation, transportation, adaptation of housing facilities. However, this agreement guarantees everybody the right to return to their homes, regardless of where the homes are.

[B-H PRESS] Are you satisfied with process of the return of refugees within the Federation?

[Silajdzic] No, I am not satisfied. I think that there is still opposition to this on the Croat side, although the situation is better than it was. I am primarily dissatisfied with our inability to organize the security system, namely the joint police force. Our suggestion about a federal police that would guarantee the safety of those returning to Stolac, Jajce, and Bugojno has not been accepted.

[B-H PRESS] Does the Government of the Republic and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina have funds to act promptly regarding the repair of damaged property and the refugees' return, if a need for this arises?

[Silajdzic] Of course it doesn't. However, we have spent whatever we had. We have practically spent everything we had on the repair of damaged facilities in the municipalities.

[B-H PRESS] How do you comment on the resignations offered by Federation President Zubak, Foreign Minister Sacirbegovic, and Justice Minister Tadic?

[Silajdzic] The foreign minister's offer of resignation is the result of the fact that we have agreed that the foreign minister should be a Croat. Regarding the resignation by Mr. Zubak, you should ask him about that. Minister Tadic has not tendered his resignation to me.

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[B-H PRESS] Is it true that Minister Sacirbegovic has offered his resignation to President Izetbegovic, and not to you, as he should have?

[Silajdzic] Yes.

[B-H PRESS] Why.

[Silajdzic] You should ask him.

[B-H PRESS] Will you accept the resignation of Justice Minister Mate Tadic?

[Silajdzic] We will consider this issue.

**Sacirbegovic Views FRY Succession in OSCE**

*AU0512201295 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The new minister of foreign affairs of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be appointed by the New Year, Muhamed Sacirbegovic, Bosnia-Herzegovina's foreign minister, stated today. The minister gave no details about the appointment of his successor.

Sacirbegovic also announced a lively political schedule by the representatives of our country in the next two weeks, starting with the meeting of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] at the ministerial level on 6, 7, and 8 December in Budapest. The meeting will discuss the preparations that this organization has to undertake before the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the deployment of observers in Kosovo, and other issues. With the expectation that the membership of the so-called Yugoslavia will also be discussed, the Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation will present the view that it is necessary to establish whether the so-called Yugoslavia fulfills some basic conditions for membership of the OSCE, such as the respect for human rights. If the membership of the so-called Yugoslavia in the OSCE is approved, Bosnia-Herzegovina will insist that this country be admitted as a new state, not as the successor state of the SFRY.

Minister Sacirbegovic also announced that, in the afternoon of 8 December, the London conference will commence on the details of the peace agreement that was initialed in Dayton. He stressed that Bosnia-Herzegovina would not agree to any changes in the Dayton agreement at this meeting.

The ICO [Islamic Conference Organization] foreign ministers will participate at the conference for aiding Bosnia-Herzegovina to be held from 9 to 13 December in Guinea. The meeting of the foreign ministers of the Contact Group and the ICO Contact Group will be held on 13 December in Paris, while on 14 December the agreement initialed in Dayton is expected to be signed in Paris. Foreign ministers and more prominent military representatives will meet on 18 December in Bonn to discuss the concept of regional security. The conference for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, initiated by the EU and the World Bank, will be held on 20 and 21 December in Brussels.

**Comments on Serbs in Sarajevo**

*BR0512162595 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 4 Dec 95 p 7*

[Interview with Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic by Marjon Van Royen in Sarajevo on 4 December: "Sacirbegovic: 'The Dayton Agreement Is Not a Pudding'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *"I see no reason whatsoever why we cannot send Bosnian policemen into Serbian districts. The Serbian districts of Sarajevo must be brought under the control of Bosnian law. War criminals must be arrested and tried. And those who want to live in ethnically pure Serbian districts will simply have to leave, I am afraid."*

*Bosnian Foreign Minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic, who is soon to leave to be replaced by a Bosnian Croat, sees the unification of Sarajevo as the biggest problem facing his government. Every day brings demonstrations in the Serbian neighborhoods. Angry and frightened citizens refuse to live under the "Muslim authorities" or the central government. Some families have apparently even dug up the bodies of their loved ones in order to bury them elsewhere in "Serbian soil." Soldiers vow to resist "until the last drop of blood." And Serbian snipers continue to fire on the wide Sarajevo boulevard.*

*The French commander of the Blue Helmets in Sarajevo, General Bachelet, and French President Jacques Chirac have called upon the Bosnian Government to give "more guarantees" to the Serbian areas of Sarajevo. This enrages Sacirbegovic: "An agreement is not a pudding," he says. "All the parties to the Dayton agreement, including the French, agreed that Sarajevo would become an undivided city, under Bosnian control. So it is certainly not up to the UN commander in Sarajevo or the French president to start going back on it. That opens up a Pandora's box and everything will then go up in smoke. The Bosnians are not overjoyed by the agreement either. But it is the only agreement we have got. And it must therefore be implemented. Without implementation there is no agreement and thus no peace."*

[Van Royen] The government wants to track down war criminals in the Serbian districts. How do you define a war criminal?

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[Sacirbegovic] Why must we make things unclear by putting forward our own definitions? The definition is given by the War Tribunal in The Hague and by international law. If we soon have the international troops, and international observers, police, and humanitarian organizations which guarantee that nobody is wrongfully treated, there is no reason for Bosnia to say: We want our own concept of what a war criminal is. Under international law, deliberate firing on civilians and civilian areas is a war crime.

[Van Royen] That means that virtually every man in the Serbian areas is a war criminal.

[Sacirbegovic] If that is the conclusion under international law, why should Bosnia be more ready to forgive them than the War Tribunal in The Hague? Why should we grant an amnesty to people whom prosecutor Goldstone wants to bring charges against? International laws of war define what you can and cannot do as a soldier. And this most certainly does not include the indiscriminate bombing of a city.

[Van Royen] Will you be leaving it up to the international community to hunt down the war criminals or will the Bosnian police do it?

[Sacirbegovic] By the terms of Dayton, our police forces may not enter Serbian areas for 90 days. After that we will apply the same criteria as Goldstone. Some will be sent to The Hague. Others we will try ourselves. The War Tribunal has the mandate to check that our procedures are just and in accordance with international standards. So we will not arrest people at random. We will not hold any trials behind closed doors or simply lock people away. Every step of our legal procedure will be in accordance with the international standards.

[Van Royen] You are not ready to discuss amnesty for ordinary solders?

[Sacirbegovic] Bosnian Serbian soldiers need no amnesty, as their army was legitimized by the Dayton peace agreement. For us that is one of the unpleasant aspects of the agreement. Every demobilized soldier who is not accused of war crimes is an ordinary citizen for us. But we are not going to have former soldiers who continue as Serbian soldiers in civilian clothing.

[Van Royen] How do you expect to do this in practice, without it leading to war in the Serbian areas?

[Sacirbegovic] I do not need to answer that question. Your question is in fact how we think we can find a way of making peace with war criminals. I make peace with civilians and demobilized soldiers. But not with war criminals.

[Van Royen] As soon as Bosnian police enter the Serbian areas there is going to be shooting.

[Sacirbegovic] Because they are not prepared to accept our authority. The restoration of the civil authority of Bosnia in these areas means in practice that many Serbs must give up the houses which belonged to Muslims or Croats before the war. Thousands of refugees from elsewhere are living there. If a Serb returns and demands his house, the Dayton agreement states that it must be returned to him. The same must apply on the other side. The hysteria in the Serbian areas is a combination of manipulation by the Bosnian Serbian authorities, and the real fear of people that they will be confronted with the original occupants of the house they are now living in.

[Van Royen] Would it not be more practical to say that everyone stays where they are?

[Sacirbegovic] No, because when you start improvising, you are living with the consequences of crime. That would also encourage the formation of ethnic ghettos which would be worse than in the Bronx in New York. What these Serbs are demanding is the formation of Serbian ghettos in a united Sarajevo. That means that one of the central points of the peace accord, the right to return to your original home, is discarded.

[Van Royen] Is not the essence of this peace agreement that Bosnia is in fact divided up into ethnic ghettos?

[Sacirbegovic] Yes, but the idea is also that we can reverse this process. Historically, Bosnia has never been a ghetto. Sarajevo's intention is that everybody should live together in this city. People still feel threatened. The Serbs can still cut the cables and turn off the city's gas and water. People only learn to live together again when they have a common interest.

[Van Royen] The Serbs already have their mono-ethnic part of Bosnia?

[Sacirbegovic] They have something known as the Serb Republic. Not on paper, but certainly in practice. Let these people go there if they want to. But I am told by our Serbian leaders that 70 percent of the people want to live again in a united Sarajevo. Why should we allow the 30 percent who want the present situation to continue to intimidate the others? Why should we give them special status, so that they can build up their own police force and their own army? That is worse than the American ghettos. And we do not want this in Bosnia.

[Van Royen] The Bosnian Serb leaders are calling for a transitional period under international control for the Serbian districts. How do you see this?

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[Sacirbegovic] There is to be a transitional period of 90 days. That gives people the time to psychologically adjust to the idea. If you prolong this to a year or more, you then give them the opportunity to set up their own structures. Then Sarajevo would probably be perpetually divided, like Mostar. I am aware of conflicting interests. But our overriding interest is the security of the city, and the restoration of its multiethnic nature. Our country is called Bosnia, and all ethnic and religious groups are entitled to identify with the country. We cannot sacrifice this general interest to those who want to be chief of their own mono-ethnic area.

[Van Royen] Do you see the continued existence of the Serbian areas as a threat to Sarajevo's security?

[Sacirbegovic] Of course. In these areas there are still Russian, Ukrainian, and Greek mercenaries who can climb to the top of an apartment building and decide that it is fun to take potshots at the inhabitants of the city. My God, is that not much more serious than at a particular time saying that those who do not obey the laws of the city and who have something to fear from the international laws of war will have to deal with the police? You say the people there are afraid. But what should we do? Allow a new Serbian police force to be created? Allow people to carry guns so that they can fire at any passing car? The concept of "state of law" must return to Sarajevo. And I also mean that on our side. Because here too Sarajevo remains in many respects the Wild West.

### Croats Prepare for Constituent Assembly 11-12 Dec

*AU0612090895 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 5 Dec 95 p 6*

[Unattributed report: "Agreement on the Implementation of the Accord"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Mostar—Kresimir Zubak, president of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and president of the Presidential Council of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, and Ivan Bender, chairman of the Chamber of Representatives of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, yesterday received a delegation of international observers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will be visiting that country for several days. As Bender said, they discussed the implementation of the Dayton agreement and preparations for the session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which will be held on 11 and 12 December.

The most senior representatives of the Croat and Bosniak people will soon meet to discuss the session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bender said, adding that the session of Chamber of Representatives of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia will meet on Saturday, 9 December, to prepare for the session of the Constituent Assembly. According to Bender, "the session will raise fresh questions regarding the Dayton agreement, the questions that refer to the changes to the Constitution of the Federation and the future setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Amendments to the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bender explained, will affect the territorial organization of the cantons. Bender also said that the session of the Constituent Assembly of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina will also discuss the separation of powers between the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In reply to a journalist's question on whether there was a possibility of demanding changes to the territorial delineations agreed upon in Dayton at the Constituent Assembly's session, Bender said:

"If there are to be any changes to the agreement, we expect a more favorable solution for the Croats in Posavina."

### NATO Equipment, Tactics Seen as Inappropriate

*AU0512162495 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Dec 95 pp 14-15*

[Commentary by Mario Galic: "NATO Troops Will Spend Their Dollars Only at Hotels!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Unfortunately, the announcements and expectations that Croatia will earn an enviable amount of dollars thanks to the arrival of the NATO forces to Bosnia-Herzegovina are, realistically speaking, groundless.

True, if the UN forces in Croatia are taken as an example, one can expect that the forces, as many as 60,000 troops, will spend some money. However, one must not neglect the essential difference between the UN and the NATO forces.

The members of the UN peace forces have spent their budget in Croatia without any control, having tried to satisfy their logistical needs as much as possible in the region where they have been deployed. The situation was similar with the purchase of oil. On the other hand, national combat units are to arrive in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose "adventure" will be paid for by the taxpayers in the countries they come from. As the 60,000-strong contingent will spend around $2 billion for their arrival, their one-year stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and their return home, one can expect that they will take good care of every cent. The aforementioned price is valid only on condition that these forces will not have to carry out major combat operations. If so, that sum could be several times

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higher. As the accounts for this peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be balanced from national budgets, it is natural that the countries involved in this operation will try to return as much money as possible, directly or indirectly, to their taxpayers. And that means that it will be necessary to bring everything along with them, from the food, footwear, and clothes to the fuel. More precisely, the Americans will be eating food produced in the United States, while their tanks will be using oil processed in their refineries. After all, these are combat forces carrying out miltary tasks, and it is logical that they use their own logistics.

What can Croatia offer to the NATO forces then? First, all the forces that will be going to Bosnia-Herzegovina will have to pass across Croatian territory, and that has to be paid for without further ado. For example, according to the announcements so far, the British and the French forces will enter Bosnia-Herzegovina through the Croatian ports of Ploce and Split. For that, they will have to pay all the port taxes, duties, and services. The Americans will arrive across Austria and Hungary by train, and then by road across Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the use of the roads can also be charged. Moreover, NATO will have to pay for all the airport services at Pleso [Zagreb] and Divulje [Split] airports, as well as the expenses for hiring the buildings in Selska Street [in Zagreb]. However, all those expe s are far lower than the expected $3 million a day. The fact that the majority of the 60,000 troops will be permanently deployed on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that they will rent buildings and hangars for the army and equipment there, is not in our own interests, either. Even if they have any need for a labor force to do the simplest jobs, they will employ the qualified population locally. However, there will be no great need for anything like that, because the NATO forces use very sophisticated combat systems, about which the experts take great care, and all the hard labor is done by machines. So, Croatia will perhaps get only 1 percent of the $2 billion, that is, around $20 million, and primarily from the transport services. Bosnia-Herzegovina will earn far more from the NATO units.

However, one must not neglect the fact that at least 60,000 well-paid people will be staying in our immediate neighborhood, people who will, from time to time, wish for some relaxation and leisure, in order to forget for a moment the stressful situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the Dalmatian coast is full of catering establishments that, true, are open mostly in summer. Since the NATO troops cannot spend their vacations anywhere but in Croatia, most probably on the Adriatic, this fact should be made full use of. Here is a real opportunity to earn, because the well-paid, but tired troops will be all too ready to pay for an appropriate service. Thus, Croatia will also earn the most thanks to its tourism, even though it is so-called "war-tourism."

It is interesting to analyze the principle behind the formation of the forces NATO will be using in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is obviously a combination of abundance and exceptional firepower by which they will try to prevent any ideas the local armies may have about armed resistance, although the United States will be sending members of the 1st Armored Division, based in Germany. Great Britain will be sending members of the 3d Armored Division, and France its legionaries, reinforced by the armored forces. Only five years ago, all of them saw their main purpose in stopping an invasion of Russian tanks that would overflow the European countries in the event of World War III, and that is why they are equipped with the best available to their armies. Thus, the most up-to-date tanks: Abrams, Challenger, and AMX, will find themselves in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the French will perhaps bring the most recent Leclerc tanks. Beside the tanks, there will be hundreds of other modern armored combat vehicles. They will be protected from the air by combat helicopters like the Apache or Lynx. One should not forget the strong artillery, as well as the large-scale support of warplanes from the aircraft carriers in the Adriatic and the airbases in Italy.

It is precisely this large military power of the NATO units in Bosnia-Herzegovina that could be counterproductive, because they are going in as if they were starting a traditional campaign against a well-armed enemy whom they intend to destroy by their firepower, but in Bosnia-Herzegovina they will face a policing operation and an opponent who does not intend to attack openly. How do the NATO commanders think they can use Abrams tanks or Apache helicopters against guerrillas in towns? If they attack at all, the Serbs will use terrorism and guerrilla tactics against the Americans and the others. That means that they will be attacking NATO soldiers while they are strolling down the streets of some town or resting in their camps. Of course, nobody will be so foolish as to shoot at a well-armored Apache helicopter, but some heavy and slow cargo helicopter flying over a forest would make a very easy target. A classic cumulative antitank mine or rocket can hardly destroy an Abrams or Leclerc, but it can destroy any truck or lightly armored vehicle without difficulty. The worst thing is that such attacks can be carried out without difficulty by groups of two or three men that can disperse easily and disappear without trace. Thus, NATO is taking exceptional firepower to Bosnia-Herzegovina that it will not be able to use, because it is absolutely

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disproportionate to the task in hand. The enemy will adopt tactics that will make the present equipment useless and purposeless.

Such attacks, if they become more frequent, could take dozens of Western soldiers' lives each day, but without crossing the limit that would allow NATO to could act openly against the attacker with its fire power, such as with large-scale air strikes against major targets. Nobody will justify the bombing of Serbian towns just because some "crazy" Serb killed three U.S. soldiers while they were passing through his village. Not even the bombing of the village itself would be allowed.

Thus the NATO forces are getting involved in a combat mission for which they have been neither trained nor equipped and on which they will certainly spend at least $2 billion and perhaps lose several hundred soldiers. Nevertheless, it is too high a price for an operation that most probably will not bring peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina!

**Milosevic Seeks To Replace Karadzic With Koljevic**

*LD0512163295 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1533 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 5 Dec (SRNA)—Some Serb Republic leaders are preparing to deal a decisive "blow" to President Radovan Karadzic, which should be dealt just prior to the signing of the peace agreement in Paris, or immediately after that.

Sources close to the Serb Republic leadership have told BETA [independent Belgrade news agency] that official Belgrade "has lost patience" and that it can no longer wait for Karadzic's gradual departure, or just an announcement of his departure.

Belgrade believes that Karadzic's maintaining the office of the Serb Republic president would burden the Serb side in the peace process, due to the charges of war crimes and genocide brought against him by the tribunal in The Hague.

According to the same sources, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has put ultimatum-like pressure on the man of his choice in Bosnia, Nikola Koljevic, the Serb Republic vice president, demanding that he begin "settling accounts" with Karadzic immediately.

"I trust Koljevic will come forward on the political scene as Karadzic's direct opponent," the same source has said.

The authorities in Belgrade have already managed to secure considerable political support in Banja Luka and in the area of western Bosnia where Karadzic's influence has significantly declined, or has "vanished" altogether.

In Banja Luka, BETA's source says, a stage has been set for such an outcome. Milosevic has managed to win over most of the deputies to the parliament of the Serb Republic from this area.

Being aware of increasing pressure from Banja Luka, Karadzic and the speaker of parliament, Momcilo Krajisnik, tried to call a session of parliament last week in order to elicit support for their political agenda. The Dayton agreement was to be discussed at this session as Pale demanded it should be changed and altered. The deputies, according to the same source, had already been invited to the session but Karadzic and Krajisnik gave up on their intention to embark on a parliamentary debate as they were unsure about how the deputies in Banja Luka would have voted.

"I do not believe that anyone in Belgrade, or Pale, or Banja Luka wants to exacerbate the regional dispute between the east and the west part of the Serb Republic, but I believe that the friction between these areas will be used in fighting Karadzic," BETA's source said.

**Rumors of Serb Republic Leadership Split Refuted**

*LD0612212395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0906 GMT 6 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 6 Nov (SRNA)—The media campaign to destabilize the Serb Republic has been stepped up as there are speculations about alleged preparations for dismissing President Radovan Karadzic, SRNA has learned from sources close to the leadership.

The ultimate aim of such insinuations is, most probably, to create a situation similar to that prior to the fall of the Republic of Serb Krajina, something that has certainly no chance of success as regards the Serb Republic.

Yesterday's BETA [Belgrade-based independent news agency] report, also carried by some other agencies, that "some leaders" of the Serb Republic are preparing to deal "the decisive blow" against the president of the Serb Republic, is evidently yet another futile attempt to eradicate the results of nearly four years of struggle during which the Serb people have fought for their basic right to a free life in their own country and their own state.

Such insinuations and similar claims have nothing to do with the true situation in the inner leadership of the Serb Republic and among other officials where there is full unity on all crucial issues.

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Nor is there, as regards this issue, any friction or any kind of difference between the state leadership and the top brass of the Serb Republic Army.

Firm unity and commitment to the shared interests of the Serb Republic totally prevail in the Serbian Democratic Party of Serbian Lands [SDS-SZ] Deputies Club and also in its leadership. SRNA has learned that there are no disagreements either in the Independent Deputies' Club or the assembly of the Serb Republic on major state issues, a fact that generates full support for the leadership of the Serb Republic, headed by President Radovan Karadzic.

These and similar attempts have no chance of success as the leadership of the Serb Republic and their views are backed by the people and the Army, although the same trumpeters are trying to cause rifts among them.

**Serb Leader Dragic Denies Sarajevo Exodus**

*LD0512221395 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2107 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 5 December (SRNA)—Dragan Dragic, deputy prime minister of the Serb Republic Government and member of the Dayton Implementation Headquarters, today denied reports of a mass population exodus from Serb Sarajevo.

"True, some people have left but not in numbers that would exceed the usual level of circulation of people to and from the town," Dragic said in a statement for SRNA.

He added that the population of Serb Sarajevo "is upset and confused" about the decisions made in Dayton, but they are nevertheless firm in their determination to demonstrate their political will to remain on their territory by staging numerous rallies and the forthcoming referendum.

Dragic pointed out the absurd irony of the fact "that one of the basic provisions in the agreement refers to the return of refugees and their compensation, whereas this same agreement makes 130,000 Sarajevo Serbs face the threat of exodus." The deputy prime minister of the Serb Republic noted that "realistically, the entire implementation of the Dayton package may be at stake" because of this issue.

He believes that as early as at the London conference the international community will find a satisfying solution for Serb Sarajevo. Otherwise, "ethnic cleansing of Serbs from this town may be the first chapter of Dayton."

"Something that is bad at its outset cannot result in something good," the Serb Republic's deputy prime minister said, expressing his belief "that as regards Serb Sarajevo realistic views will prevail within the international community."

"This realistic approach has already been demonstrated in recent days by the members of the French UN Protection Force batallion, stationed in Sarajevo, who are familiar with the situation on the ground," Dragic said.

**Serb Patriotic Front: Serbs Accept Coexistence**

*AU0512204095 (Clandestine) Krajina Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The central committee of the Serb democratic alliance of the Banja Luka patriotic front stated yesterday that there was no alternative to the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina initialed in Dayton because it ended the war and rejected militant policy. The state of mind and the political consciousness of the soldiers and people of the Serb Republic have evolved to the point at which they are ready to accept coexistence in the Bosnia-Herzegovina union on democratic principles, says the statement. The party regards as justified the protests of the Sarajevo Serbs and the Krajina Serbs, who have been deprived of their purely ethnic territories, even Sanski Most and Kljuc, nor does it believe that the Posavina corridor is wide enough. The statement demands the return of refugees to their homes, fair compensation for property that was destroyed or taken away, exchange or reimbursement for those who do not wish to return, educational and religious autonomy in both entities, and a special status for Sarajevo, whose authorities would be analogous to those of the Bosnia-Herzegovina union.

**SDS Official Wants Additions to Dayton Accord**

*AU0512203195 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The Dayton agreement was reached after much blackmail and many threats, against the will of the part of the delegation from the Serb Republic, because the agreement is most detrimental to the Serb side, especially regarding Serb Sarajevo and Vukosavlje [Odzak]. This was stated by Milos Milincic, president of the municipal committee and member of the Serb Democratic Party [SDS] central committee, as he reported on a recent session of the republic committee and the club of SDS deputies, at which our delegation submitted a report on the Dayton talks. He emphasized that the political and state leadership must become very active on the diplomatic scene and attempt to set right the injustice, not by changes but by additions to the Dayton agreement.

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[Begin Milincic recording] I think the international mediators left the possibility to the Serb Republic to exist as a state, provided that its policy is wise, serious, led by modern people, as it were, by homo sapiens, who would take into account all the factors that are important at present, so that they can guide us to our goal, that is, to Serbia. [end recording]

The sole value of the Dayton agreement is that the Serb Republic was recognized as an independent entity in relation to the Muslim-Croat Federation, which means that we can proceed with creating an independent Serb state and realizing the final Serb national interest. We must soberly go toward that goal, without making any wrong moves that could be a hindrance to its achievement, [he said] as a conclusion [to the meeting] of the SDS municipal committee in Srbac.

### Herzegovina Serbs Demand Changes

*AU0512160995 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] The war presidency of the Serb municipality of Mostar and Serbs from the Neretva River valley expressed support to the Serb Republic state authorities at the Paris conference for their efforts to secure a more favorable solution for the parts of the republic that have, with the Dayton agreement, come under direct threat.

In a letter to the state authorities of the Serb Republic and Serbia, as well as to the president of the war presidency of Serb Sarajevo, it is stated that the Dayton agreement is unjust towards the Serb people throughout the country, particularly those of Serb Sarajevo, Serb Mostar, and Serb Herzegovina. We are prepared to make additional sacrifices to create the conditions for this area, as well as Serb Sarajevo, to remain within the Serb Republic, says the letter of the war presidency of Serb Mostar and Serbs from Serb Herzegovina.

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**Matesa, Bosnian-Croat Official on Cooperation**

*LD0512173295 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian Prime Minister Zlatko Matesa met Jadranko Prlic, deputy prime minister of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and prime minister of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, in Zagreb this afternoon. After the talks, held behind closed doors, the two officials said they had discussed possibilities of improving cooperation between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina after the Dayton agreement. Here are their statements:

[Begin recording] [Prlic] A whole new range of economic and other possibilities is opening up from the Washington [as received] agreement, which as you know, deepen ties, in economic and all other fields, between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. We also discussed specific measures—the revival of certain economic capacities, the shaping of the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia, the formation of the federation, and the development of a compatible economic system that would mean in effect the formation of a customs union between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Matesa] First, I wish to make clear to everyone that Croatia is vitally interested in the future of Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the survival of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and will do everything it can in that direction. Second, there is a whole series of international conferences ahead of us, from political to economic ones, and the question of reconstruction—both of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia—and Mr. Prlic and I are in complete agreement that the Republic of Croatia and the Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and Bosnia-Herzegovina coordinate their positions at these conferences in their mutual interests. We should also stress that we are facing a period full of far more intensive economic ties between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that we have reached complete agreement on that. [end recording]

**Mutual Recognition of Croatia, FRY Viewed**

*AU0612081595 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 1 Dec 95 pp 2-3, 10*

[Article by Davor Ivankovic and Nebojsa Tarabа: "Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic Will Sign Agreement on Mutual Recognition of Croatia and Yugoslavia in Versailles in December!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In mid-December this year at the summit in Paris, Croatia will recognize the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY]. Moreover, Croatia will also recognize its uninterrupted state continuity. This information has been confirmed from the most responsible places: from the Croatian Presidential Office, and from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs could neither confirm nor deny the authenticity of the "Agreement on Normalization of Relations," because "they did not have the text of the agreement." Nevertheless, we have been given clear indications that the Ministry knows it is an agreement at the level of the presidents of the states.

What is in this draft document, consisting of 12 articles, which will be signed in Paris, at the Versailles castle, by the presidents of Croatia and the FRY, Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Slobodan Milosevic?

Calling upon, as stated in the draft agreement, "the awareness of their responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of peace and security in the region, the wish to promote good relations between their citizens and peoples, the contribution toward that end through the normalization of mutual relations, all relevant resolutions of the UN Security Council," the Republic of Croatia and the FRY have agreed "to respect each other as independent states within their international borders."

In Article 2 this standpoint is more elaborated: "Each party shall respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence of the other party."

The agreement also deals with the borders, that is, with the possibility of the border changes—"The parties affirm that they shall make adjustments to their borders only by mutual consent, shall settle disputes by peaceful means and refrain from the threat or use of force in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." It also says that the parties will seek to foster mutual understanding, good will, and tolerance, and cooperate in promoting peace, stability, and development in the region.

The next provision of the draft agreement brings a surprise: in Article 3 the parties bind themselves, within 15 days after the agreement enters into force, to establish full diplomatic and consular relations. That means that they will promptly upgrade their representative offices in Zagreb and Belgrade to embassies and "exchange ambassadors."

Article 4 will cause a lot of anxiety among the Croatian public, but also among experts, although all the legal and practical consequences of that part of the agreement are yet to be seen. It says: "Respectful of the historic fact of the legality of the States of Serbia and Montenegro before the creation of Yugoslavia and of the fact that

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Yugoslavia inherited the international personality and legality of Serbia and Montenegro, the Republic of Croatia respects the State continuity of the FRY." A sentence follows which additionally explains that the previous provision and the recognition of the state continuity "will not affect questions of succession in accordance with the outcome of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia."

**Environment Protection**

By Article 5 of the draft agreement, Croatia and the FRY bind themselves to "fully protect the rights of persons of national minorities within the borders in accordance with the highest international standards." The word is also about the refugees: "The parties shall cooperate in assisting refugees and displaced persons to exercise their right to return their homes and property or in providing just compensation."

Croatia and the FRY have bound themselves to solve those questions peacefully. The parties shall make arrangements for the payment of pensions to the citizens of the other party and for dealing with all other issues within the scope of normal consular protection and services to their respective citizens, and they shall immediately enter the negotiations to resolve outstanding issues related to these matters. It is important that the agreement concerning compensation for property shall be agreed upon within six months from the date of signing of this agreement.

Article 6 of the draft agreement starts with a provision that "within 15 days after the entry of this agreement into force, the parties shall establish normal road, railroad, air, and river traffic!" Croatia and the FRY have agreed here to permit free movement of nationals and vehicles of the other party into and within its territory in accordance with procedures applicable to nationals and vehicles of other states. Neither party should "impose discriminatory restrictions on the free movement of persons and vehicles from its own territory to the territory of the other party."

Furthermore, Article 7 mentions the mutual obligations to establish normal postal, telephone, telex, and all other telecommunication links.

Article 8 mentions a 15-day period to open the oil pipeline and that the parties have bound themselves to "strengthen and intensify their economic and commercial relations in all fields, including industrial cooperation between enterprises." It is further explained that Croatia and the FRY shall establish a free and unimpeded flow of goods and services, and that they shall immediately start negotiations on economic and trade cooperation "for the promotion of mutually beneficial economic and commercial relations."

The text of the agreement deals also with some themes that do not have much to do with politics, such that Article 9 states Croatia and the FRY will cooperate in preservation and protection of the environment, and in particular in the elimination of all forms of pollution in border areas. Moreover, they have bound themselves to develop and coordinate strategies and programs for regional and international protection of the environment!

Article 10 mentions also the objects of cultural heritage, and regarding their return and repair, "the parties shall cooperate in accordance with the provisions of international law." Further, the parties shall establish normal cultural relations and "encourage cultural exchange of all kinds."

Similar provisions on scientific and technical cooperation, and exchange of such information and documentation, find themselves in Article 11. It also mentions making possible the access to the archives and scientific and research institutions.

Article 12 states that "the agreement shall enter into force upon its signing."

Such agreement, the contents of which President Tudjman and President Milosevic approved in Dayton, will create, immediately upon its signing, numerous political and public controversies! The signing of this agreement will draw the attempts of recognition of the warring states of the Republic of Croatia and the FRY to their end.

**Continuity of the FRY**

Article 4 represents a part of the agreement which will result in the aforementioned and expected controversies. In the first part of the Article, Croatia recognizes de facto the state continuity of the FRY, which every analyst will immediately associate with the issue of the property of the once common state of the SFRY, and its distribution. In the first part of Article 4, Croatia formally and legally recognizes Serbia's right to succession, and declares itself a secessionist, while in the other part of Article 4 it is pointed out that "the respect of continuity and legality of the FRY would not affect questions of succession," but that these questions will depend upon the conclusions, results, and solutions, reached by the end of the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia. It is obviously a contradiction about which many legal experts and politicians will have to say something—both in Croatia and in the FRY. There is also a possibility that some other annexes to this

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agreement have been made, which make a constituent part of secret diplomacy, and which can explain this legal and formal mess and understatement.

As long as this is not explained, we will use previous thoughts of several legal experts who had been dealing with this problem. Croatian legal experts, when talking about the succession, have always been pointing out that this question was the most important for the accomplishment of the disintegration of the former SFRY.

One of the most prominent Croatian experts in international law, Vladimir-Djuro Degan, basing his opinion also upon the stands of the Arbitration Committee within the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, says that "the political decisionmakers in Serbia, as early as from the beginning of the process of the communist power monopoly collapsing in the former FRY, claimed that as early as the union in 1918, the Kingdom of Serbia and the Kingdom of Montenegro had maintained their continuity in the new Kingdom of the Serbs, the Croats, and the Slovenes. The four other republics have allegedly 'seceded' from the SFRY, which allegedly does not influence its survival within its reduced borders."

Dr. Degan refers to the statements of the Serbian side that the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence were unilateral and therefore illegal acts, and that the secession was carried out forcefully.

"On one hand, those statements have been an excuse for the JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] military intervention against those republics, and for all the damages and human losses which have been the result of it. Further, on that basis, without a legal background, they intended to punish somehow the 'secessionist' republics by denying them any right to succession of the property of the SFRY." Dr. Degan, legal expert, makes a conclusion on the Serbian intentions with the story about the statehood continuity, mentioning that "there is also a possibility of control over the property of the former state abroad, until its distribution in the far future, which can continuously be postponed by the obstruction of the negotiations about the succession."

By Croatia's recognition of the continuity of the FRY, Croatia basically jeopardizes its rights in the distribution of the former state-owned property of the SFRY. Concretely, the point in question is the immovable and movable property of the JNA, federal customs and other federal bodies, the property of the National Bank of Yugoslavia, federal foreign currency reserves, the rights from the loans approved to and the clearing balance of the third countries, which have been indebted with the former SFRY, and similar. Only the remaining foreign currency reserves and gold are estimated to at least $2 billion!

Apart from the agreement on recognition, other documents agreed upon at Wright-Patterson Air Base will be signed in Versailles. The initialed Dayton agreement consists of some 100 pages of different documents. In it there are also some letters of guarantee given by all the sides, which refer to the security of NATO troops and IFOR [Implementation Force]. In the correspondence, one can find confirmations by which the representatives of the three states confirm their readiness to cooperate and accept the offered principles of peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

**NATO and Privileges**

Thus, the agreement between the Republic of Croatia and NATO confirms the immunity and privileges of all the personnel of the Western alliance in Croatia; in return they have to respect Croatian laws. The Government of the Republic of Croatia enables quick arrival and departure of NATO personnel, they will be exempt from the customs procedures, they will have to wear an identification card and show it to Croatian officials, but that must not disable or slow down NATO troop movements. The NATO members will be wearing their uniforms, they will be allowed to carry weapons (if they have internal authorization), and their driver's licenses will be valid. NATO will be entitled to put up its own flags and symbols.

The NATO personnel will be immune to personal arrest or custody in the territory of Croatia, and should a "mistake" happen, and Croatian authorities put some of NATO members under arrest "he has to be immediately returned under jurisdiction of NATO." Further, Croatia will enable all NATO vehicles, ships, aircraft, and equipment to have a free and unlimited access and passage through Croatia, including Croatian air space and territorial sea. This right also involves setting up camps, training, and maneuvers in all the fields needed for the activities of NATO forces.

NATO vehicles will not have to be insured under commercial conditions, which means that it is best to avoid them, because it will obviously not be easy to get a compensation for possible damage. NATO will be using Croatian roads, airports, and harbors without charge, and they expect that for all the services they will be paying (electricity, water, food, etc.) the Croatian Government will charge "at the lowest price." All equipment, food, machines, etc. will be imported into and exported out of Croatia without customs fees and taxes. The international forces will be allowed to establish their own postal, telephone, and other electronic links, including both radio and TV stations.

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To meet its own needs, NATO will also hire Croatian labor, which will remain subject to Croatian laws and regulations. However, the Croats employed by NATO will not be able to be charged for written or uttered words, they will be relieved from army service, they will be exempt from taxes, and they will not pay taxes on their salaries to the state.

Also, NATO will be allowed to reconstruct and modify certain roads, bridges, buildings, tunnels, and similar objects.

In addition to the agreement, Croatia has bound itself to respect all the annexes to the document, and Foreign Minister Mate Granic has specially granted to Butrus Ghali at the UN, and Sergio Silvio Balanzino, actual NATO secretary general, "that Croatia shall strictly refrain from introducing into or otherwise maintaining in Bosnia-Herzegovina any armed forces or other personnel with military capability." Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has given and signed the letter of guarantee with the same text, regarding the Armed Forces of FRY.

**[Box, p 10]**

**Croatian Foreign Minister's Letter of Guarantee Sent to UN Secretary General**

His Excellency Butrus Butrus-Ghali

Secretary General, United Nations, New York

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

I refer to the Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement attached as Annex 1-A to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Recognizing the importance of a comprehensive peace settlement to bring an end to the tragic conflict in the region, I have the honor to provide the following undertaking to promote achievement of that objective.

On behalf of the Republic of Croatia, I wish to assure the United Nations that, to facilitate accomplishment of the mission of the multinational military Implementation Force (IFOR) referred to in Annex 1-A, the Republic of Croatia shall strictly refrain from introducing into or otherwise maintaining in Bosnia-Herzegovina any armed forces or other personnel with military capability.

Sincerely,

Mate Granic, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs

**[Box, pp 2-3]**

**Polling Report**

The poll involves 700 interviewees randomly selected from all over Croatia. The date this poll was carried is not mentioned. The results of the poll are expressed in percentages and presented in several charts as follows:

**1. Should the mutual recognition have been postponed until the reintegration of eastern Slavonia into the legal and political system of Croatia?**

| | |
|---|---|
| Yes | 64.5 |
| No | 23.8 |
| Do not know | 11.7 |
| Total | 100.0 |

**2. Do you think Yugoslavia should, before the recognition, pay war damages to Croatia?**

| | |
|---|---|
| Yes | 79.5 |
| No | |
| 8.3 | |
| Do not know | 12.2 |
| Total | 100.0 |

**3. Do you think Croatia should import industrial products and food from the FRY?**

| | |
|---|---|
| Yes | 16.6 |
| No | 71.9 |
| Do not know | 11.5 |
| Total | 100.0 |

**4. Do you find it acceptable that Croatia immediately enables border traffic with the FRY?**

| | |
|---|---|
| Yes | 43.8 |
| No | 34.8 |
| Do not know | 21.4 |
| Total | 100.0 |

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| 5. Do you approve mutual recognition of the Republic of Croatia and the FRY? | |
|---|---|
| Yes | 40.5 |
| No | 39.2 |
| Do not know | 20.3 |
| Total | 100.0 |

**Military Attache Appointed to NATO, WEU**

*LD0112140395 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 1 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] On the basis of article 99 paragraph two and article 100 paragraph one of the Croatian Constitution and article 159 paragraph one of the Law on Services in the Croatian Armed Forces, the president of the republic adopted a decision to relieve Staff General Marin Ante Pipcevic of his duties as aide to the head of the Croatian president's military office because of a new appointment and to appoint him Croatia's military attache in Belgium and Luxemburg, and Croatia's military representative at NATO and Western European Union [WEU] in Brussels. The decision takes effect immediately.

**UN General on Dayton Implementation in Vukovar**

*BR0512160595 Paris LE MONDE in French 5 Dec 95 p 4*

[Report by Denis Hautin-Guiraut: "The Worry and Resignation of Vukovar"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The town looks out onto a field of ruins. One either side of a cleaned and maintained road stand rows of dilapidated houses and ragged buildings. In Vukovar, which was one of the first Croatian towns to fall victim to the war in 1991, it seems like nothing has changed, even though buildings are being rebuilt. Yet four years after the victorious and devastating Serbian offensive, the agreement finalized in Dayton between Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman calls for a transition period of one year—two at the most—after which the town lying on the Danube will return to Croatian administration.

At first glance, peace seems hard to impose. "We are still in a state of war," the director of the press center said, "and the curfew at 2100 is still in force." [passage omitted]

"The inhabitants of Vukovar feel that the Croats cannot take up residence on a territory that never belonged to them in the past, and far too much blood has been spilled for it to be any other way," a journalist from the official Serb daily newspaper POLITIKA said, who failed to say that this town in Croatia used to be comprised of one-third Croatians, Serbs, and other minorities before the war.

General Van de Wegne, who commands the UN detachment in the region is displaying genuine enthusiasm, however, buoyed up by the recent change in behavior. "The situation is clearly improving. Incidents of shootings between the two have fallen considerably. After the cease-fire of 25 August there were still some 30 shootings a day, but now there are just two or three." "And the population," the general said, "is beginning to get back to normal life. The school doors have been reopened, the farmers are back in the fields, and most of the time the soldiers go home at night. That is considerable progress."

**Refugees**

"Of course the Serbs still have to cooperate fully in implementing the peace plan," he explained, "but there too the behavior shown by both sides is encouraging. Regular meetings between generals from the Serbian and Croatian Armies, which had been stopped since early October, have been revived. We have also received assurance from the Serbs that we have the freedom to move around again." "Nevertheless," he concluded, "the problem posed by the return of refugees and displaced persons will be hard here, as it is elsewhere. That is why I think that the transition period must not be too short, because it will not be easy to quickly wipe away the signs of this war." At the initiative of the Red Cross and with the help of the Blue Helmets, Croat and Serb families last week found themselves, for the second time since the war, in a neutral zone. There were some 50 families on either side and the correct running of the operation led the authorities to plan another one. "In this area," the general continued, "the transitional administration will certainly play a key role. Everything will depend on the mandate and resources given to the international force that will take over from the Blue Helmets." [passage omitted]

**Government Annuls Appointment of Zagreb Mayor**

*LD0512144095 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1351 GMT 5 Nov 95*

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Dec. 5 (TANJUG)—The Croatian Government on Tuesday annulled a decision by a constitutive session of the Zagreb City Council to appoint opposition candidates a new mayor and council chairman, following the opposition's victory at local elections.

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The government explained its decision by the lack of quorum at the session that was boycotted by the ruling Croatian Democratic Union.

On the strength of that legal explanation, the government decided that another constitutive session be held on January 2 and that a new mayor and council chairman be appointed then.

Opposition parties protested about the decision, saying the Croatian Democratic Union was trying through legal tricks to eliminate decisions taken by the electorate.

The 65 percent of the electorate voted opposition in the last month's elections for the city council, they said.

Opposition parties also said they would instigate proceedings before the Constitutional Court. They said the government explanation was not legally founded, and said nothing would prevent them from setting up opposition authorities in Zagreb.

The outgoing mayor, official of the Croatian Democratic Union, refuses to hand over the office to the mayor appointed by the opposition, which has led to a confusion in the functioning of the local administration.

**Electrical Concern Sells Stocks to Saudi Firm**

*AU0512173895 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 5 Dec 54 p 5*

[Report by S.M.: "Stocks Also for the Saudis"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb—As the continuation of the privatization of the Koncar concern, an agreement on the sale of stocks to the Nesma Comp. LTD telecommunications company from Saudi Arabia was signed yesterday. The agreement was signed by Vjekoslav Srb, head of the Koncar's managing board, and Mr. Saleh al Turki, president of the Saudi company. With this first Saudi Arabian investment in Croatia, the Nesma is becoming a minority stockholder in three of Koncar's firms: Koncar Mjerni Transformatori [Koncar Measuring Transformers], Koncar Sklopna Postrojenja [Koncar Assembly Installations], and Koncar Elektricni Visoknaponski Aparati [Koncar Electrical High Voltage Instruments]. The value of the investment is about 1.5 million German marks.

The Nesma Comp. LTD was founded in 1980. Its head office is in Jedda. It has about 6,500 employees in the parent company and jointly owned companies abroad. Last year, it sold goods and services worth $230 million.

**Serb Leader: Zagreb Violating Human Rights**

*AU0512160895 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Slavko Dokmanovic, president of the council of the Srem [Srijem]-Baranja region, has warned that the Croatian authorities on the temporarily occupied parts of the Republic of Serb Krajina are ruthlessly violating the human rights of the remaining Serbs, looting, and destroying Serb property.

The remaining Serb population is under immense pressure to leave Croatia; all the conditions and prerequisites for the return of refugees are being eradicated. This is clear proof that Croatia only cares about Serb territories and not the Serbs themselves. In view of the political and other implications inherent in Croatia's conduct, the council of the Srem-Baranja region has lodged a sharp protest with the United Nations, the EU, and all relevant international political factors, with the goal of warning Croatia immediately to stop such activity, which has a tendency to exceed the limits of our tolerance, patience, and good will. We believe that this is also in the interest of the world in general, the council of the Srem-Baranja region stressed.

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### Greece Refuses Entry to 220 Since Accord

*AU0612080195 Skopje MIC in English 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] 7,152 persons from Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] have entered Greece from the signing of the Interim Accord up to November 29, and some 220 have been sent back, the pro-government newspaper "TA NEA" said yesterday. Most of the people were sent back for not having green cards or the required sum of money. Only 24 people were not allowed to enter Greece for having the toponyms of Greek origin written in "Slav language."

As MAKFAKS reports, "TA NEA" stresses that the Greek authorities do not approve passports in which the Greek birth places are written in Macedonian language.

### Judge Hopes for New Evidence on Gligorov Attack

*AU0512203095 Skopje MIC in English 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The Saturday [2 December] police action carried out in several suburbs on the territory of the Kisela Voda municipality, in which a couple of thousand of homes, garages, cellars, shacks, cars and passersby were searched, will soon reveal its results and findings in a written form, which the Interior Ministry will deliver to the District Court Judge Zdravko Vasilev, who is leading the investigation.

Namely, according to Judge Zdravko Vasilev, the police findings have been coming in from Saturday and over the next couple of days. Although there is no confirmation from the head of the investigation, it is presumed that the police report will have to contain all the traces and indications found in the action, and which might lead to the revealing of the identity of the anonymous buyer of the car bomb "Ami 8," which was used to carry out the assassination attempt on President Gligorov.

As it is known, in the action, the police were mostly interested in resellers of spare car parts, car repair shops, scissors for cutting wire, and have taken samples of sand (found in the car bomb) for laboratory analysis.

### PDP, PPDSH Form Parliamentary Group

*AU0612082595*

[FBIS Editorial Report] Zofingen RILINDJA in Albanian on 29 November carries on page 2 a 1,000-word report by Ismail Arsllani, entitled "Unity on the Horizon." The report describes the recent formation of a joint parliamentary group by the two opposition Albanian parties, the Popular Democratic Party [PDP] and the Party for the Democratic Prosperity of the Albanians [PPDSH], and the relations of these opposition parties with the Party of Democratic Prosperity [PPD], which participates in the governing coalition. The PPDSH was historically formed by members of the PPD who objected to participation in this coalition.

The report states: "Any observations about the work of the Macedonian parliament, which includes Albanian deputies from three parties and some independent members, must consider the parliamentary groups that attempt to shape international and domestic opinion on the issues affecting their electorate. Until 2 November this year, when the other two Albanian parties formed a group together, the parliamentary group of the PPD had been under continual attack from several Albanian political quarters because of its concessions to the government and its relaxed attitude to certain key demands that its participation in the government entailed.

"PPDSH representative Shazim Mehmeti said at a news conference that the parliament has used every ploy to exclude deputies of the opposition Albanian parties, in their inability to form separate parliamentary groups, from contacts with international delegations that pay visits here despite these delegations' readiness to meet with deputies even outside the parliamentary groups. The most shocking case was the recent visit by a delegation of the European Parliament headed by Doris Pack, which formed its opinion regarding the admission of the Republic of Macedonia to this forum solely on the basis of the arguments of the ruling parties, including the PPD.

"Sh. Mehmeti added that the parliament in its present composition has not shown the political goodwill to overcome its various problems, especially interethnic ones. Because of the absence of any tradition of parliamentary communication and a refusal to recognize the situation in Macedonia, the deputies of the PPDSH and the PDP have failed to make any concrete impact, despite their constructive approach as members of the opposition.

"PDP Chairman Iliaz Halimi said that the initiative to form a joint Albanian parliamentary group as a genuine opposition in the Macedonian parliament and to work toward solving the national problems of the Albanians in Macedonia was launched on the basis of affinities in the party programs, and with the agreement of the presidiums of the PDP and the PPDSH, and the commitment of their deputies.

"Asked whether any cooperation between the parliamentary group of these two parties and the PPD could be expected, Iliaz Halimi pointed out that there is no great divergence of views on essential issues among the deputies of the different Albanian parties. The differences emerge over the manner of political action. When the Local Government Law was approved, the PDP and

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PPDSH deputies walked out of the parliament, while the PPD members remained behind as participants in the governing coalition, even though their views in their speeches were the same as those of other deputies.

"PPDSH spokesman Alaidin Demiri said that the parliament had always overlooked the PPDSH and the PDP. In the absence of a parliamentary group from these two parties, foreign delegations which obtained information about the position of the Albanians in Macedonia from the ruling parties did not gain an objective impression of their real status, because four Albanian ministers do not reflect the spectrum of unsolved national problems. The parliamentary group of the ruling PPD is commited to cosmetic democracy, while the joint PPDSH and PDP group is for radical changes."

The report continues, "Deputy Zeqir Kadriu said that this parliamentary group includes two PDP and four PPDSH deputies, and operates as a single body. It is too early to talk about tangible results in the parliament, but we will from now on be organized in decisionmaking on important issues.

"Immediately after the formation of this parliamentary group of Zeqir Kadriu and Rahmi Tuda of the PDP and Arben Xhaferi, Rufi Osmani, Sali Ramadani, and Hisni Shaqiri of the PPDSH, public speculation began over whether this meant the first step toward a merger between the parties. PDP Chairman Iliaz Halimi spoke about sincere cooperation between the two parties, saying that each would preserve its individuality and autonomy. Time will tell how relations will proceed.

"PPDSH spokesman A. Demiri stressed the need for a rapprochement among Albanian political forces in the FYROM. The possibility of their unification could be considered as a second phase, on the basis of a proven Albanian program. His party colleague S. Mehmeti said that anything is possible. PDP Deputy Chairman Etem Aziri also did not exclude the possibility of a merger of the PDP and the PPDSH, an option that emerged at the PDP's most recent congress. However, analysts say that this would be a very complicated matter because of the need for a reshuffle of party officials that would extinguish some of their political ambitions."

### Commentary Looks at Development of Democracy

*AU0512111895 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 2 Dec 95 p 15*

[Commentary by Julijana Kocovska: "Cradled in Security"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Usually, there are conflicting opinions about the development of democratic processes in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], depending on whether they are expressed by the parties in opposition or by those that are ruling and on which democratic development mostly depends.

Unhappy with the election results and at being socially and politically marginalized, for which they themselves are to be blamed, the larger part of the opposition parties believe that the democratic processes have been stopped, suffocated, and that the ruling parties are allegedly introducing a totalitarian regime.

On the other hand, the alternative position rejects these assessments as tendentious and ungrounded. It believes that big achievements have been made in the development of democratic processes in Macedonia and that compared with many other countries in transition democratization is irrevocably moving toward European standards. Those who hold this position confirm this by citing the high assessments and opinions of numerous international organizations and associations which give Macedonia's democracy a satisfactory mark. As a background to this they say that it is absurd to claim that there is a slowdown in democracy just at the time when Macedonia has become a member of the Council of Europe, of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe], of the "Partnership for Peace," because these events are definitely affirming democracy. The authorities say that the claim of democracy's slowdown is an imposed, forced, and even an invented thesis that can be logical only as far as it is a part of a political platform.

#### Characteristic Silence

Anyway, the question of taking a more real approach to the accomplished democratic development without neglecting the results deserves attention. It is also necessary to point to the existing relations and the timing of the democratic development to decide whether the stopping of democracy really is a forced and invented thesis as part of the platform of the political opponents to the present government. Can we discuss this subject with more substance without labeling it as a political thesis? There is no problem in that the authorities will always try to persuade the people that events are advancing, particularly because they have been given the mandate after the elections. The problem in Macedonia lies in the fact that the after speeches of the present authorities there is a characteristic silence. There are no reactions, different opinions, or more vivid democratic atmosphere; and furthermore, this silence is not a consequence of the totalitarian system to which the opposition often points. There are political parties, nongovernmental organizations, civic associations, independent intellectuals, and professional associations, but there is still the silence.

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In the last 40 days the Republic of Macedonia has been accepted into the Council of Europe, into the OSCE, into the "Partnership for Peace." All these events deserve respect, because they demonstrate that this state is oriented toward parliamentary democracy, toward a state governed by law, toward protection of human and minorities' rights, and toward a peaceful foreign policy. Nevertheless, can the admission to international organizations liberate us from the responsibility of viewing democracy, which is so much characteristic for Macedonia? Of course, the admission also represents an obligation to develop the orientations to European principles and to support them with democracy. On the other hand, there is a slowdown in democracy and the space for democratic growth seems to be momentarily limited. Why is this so?

**Victory and Risk**

Few will disagree with the assessment that Macedonia has a uniform parliament. The opposition excluded itself from parliamentary life, and the Alliance for Macedonia won an absolute victory that puts it in a comfortable position, but at the same time it represents a risk for the democratic mechanisms. This assessment is not a result of some emotional reactions that emanate from the period of the first parliament. This parliament does not face obstructions and inefficiency, but it collides with a situation of a futile atmosphere in which the laws that are produced by the government are mainly adopted urgently, with a fantastic speed without more substantial discussions that may lead to better legal solutions. The parliament has almost no control over the government, nor does it want to have any. The government's security is stable and sure, and we have the feeling that the legal and executive powers are intermingled into one authority. International experiences show that there is no animosity in large parties, different opinions are normal, and they are ultimately useful. There are intellectuals in our parliament who have equated the government with a monolith party to such an extent that there is rarely a criticism on a legal solution. This is contrary to the great numbers of dissidents sitting in cafes. The question about the incomplete judiciary power in Macedonia is also another important indicator for the level of democracy in a society. The reform in the judiciary is moving too slowly, although independent courts are the most concrete example of a state governed by law and of citizens at the center of the system. It is no wonder, therefore, that there are frequent but not loud enough questions about the balance among the three authorities and about the mutual control among the judiciary, the executive, and the legal authorities.

**Authority and State Governed by Law**

Political analysts point out that government of law is the best guarantee for the development of a democratic society and a state governed by law. The government has missed many opportunities to demonstrate this in an explicit way. There was the affair of the "Hard Rock" and "Silex" [two demolished discotheques], up to cases filled with crime, bribery, and corruption, which represent the biggest danger for democracy and for a civil society. In spite of the fact that the government could witness that its party people, partners, or high-ranking state officials had been involved in the two affairs and in other criminal, bribery, and corruption cases, these situations must be disclosed and they must end up in court. There is a general impression among the people that a choice must not be made between the state governed by law and preservation of personal rating at any cost, even at the cost of the law. The government can endure a strong hit because of illegal activities of its personnel, but by respecting and applying the law it will have a chance of liberating itself from the dirt within its own ranks.

Can we talk about development of democratic processes in Macedonia if sources of information are closed and if there is a real information blockade? Half of Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski's cabinet—who were advocates of information freedom before occupying ministerial positions, and Ministers Ljubomir Frckovski and Vlado Popovski contributed to Article 16 of the Constitution ("Free access to information is guaranteed, receiving and distributing information is free")—now are those who run away from journalists or appear in public only on some positive occasions. News conferences of the government's spokesman Gjuner Ismail are the primary mode of communications between the government and the public; information is under the control of Minister Frckovski; Health Minister Ilija Filipce is either not available for the public or gives empty information; Minister of Justice Vlado Popovski is permanently busy; Prime Minister Crvenkovski rarely appears in public.... The public functions are becoming private functions with ease and arrogance. There is simply no readiness to give concrete information, to explain a particular activity, measure, or reshuffle to the public. In the postassassination attempt atmosphere this assessment becomes even more serious. Not only have some basic mechanisms been bypassed—as for instance the responsibility and resignation of the minister of the interior—but the investigative judge and the expert commission were marginalized, and so far not a single relevant detail has been revealed about the organizers of the assassination attempt against President Kiro Gligorov. However, the clandestine struggle for power between the SDSM [So-

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cial Democratic Alliance of Macedonia] and the liberals, as well as their rivalry in presenting their merits for the stability of the state, have been intensified.

**New Mistakes of the Opposition**

It is quite supportive to think that the opposition is quite responsible for the development of democracy in Macedonia after it decided to withdraw from parliament. The VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] and the Democratic Party stated that they did not want to be a decoration in parliament, but actually they became a decoration outside parliament. It is true that the additional elections in Skopje Constituency No. 114 do not mean much for the general schedule of political forces, but it is certainly not an excuse for the opposition to persist in its mistake and exclude itself once more from the election race. It is still repeating, parrotlike, its stances that if it participates in these elections, it will recognize the state forgery in the past year's elections and the illegitimate parliament. These stances are undoubtedly outdated even for those voters who had voted for these parties in the first election round. Who is the opposition afraid of, not to come out in the center of Skopje and fight for the elections? Does it have to remain as a prisoner of its catastrophic mistake from last year's elections even now that it is taking some different actions that, we hope, are a result of the analysis of the current situation in Macedonia? Or, will it cede the elections in Constituency 114 to the Alliance for Macedonia? Will the opposition remain inactive and complaining and will it reinforce its position of inactivity over the image of an opposition with serious democratic orientation?

There is seldom the idea of independent thought among all these elements. When there is little control over the authority, regardless of whether it is because there are no any differing opinions in parliament, because of bypassing democratic norms and mechanisms, because sources of information are locked, because there is no serious criticism, then it is not the authority's fault if it becomes cradled in its own security. In principle, it is not a good thing for the democratic development of a society, regardless of what kind of authority is at stake.

**Provisions of Draft Law on Public Assembly**

*96BA0013C Skopje VECER in Macedonian 19 Oct 95 p 8*

[Article by S.D.: "Unrestricted Public Meetings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Guided by the constitutional rights to free assembly and expression of public protests without advance announcement and special permission, in the draft law on public assembly the government does not request stronger mandatory restrictions for citizens participating in such assemblies.*

*For security reasons, organizers of such assemblies may notify the MVR [Ministry of Internal Affairs] about holding public meetings and steps taken to this effect.*

The draft law on public assembly was recently completed by the government and is expected to be debated in one of the forthcoming sessions of the highest legislative authority and to be discussed by the representatives. It is true that this draft law had already (in the first stage of its submission) been presented to the representatives. At that time, however, in the course of the debates within the parliamentary commissions, they asked the government to be more specific in terms of regulating the requirements to be met by the organizers of public assemblies.

In a second discussion of the entire topic of this area, and bearing in mind the thoughts and statements of the working bodies of the parliament, and taking global experience into consideration, the government asserted this basic civil right resting on different, more liberal principles.

**Without Mandatory Commitments**

It was precisely by being guided by the constitutional right that "the citizens have the right to assemble peacefully and to express public protests without advance notification and special permits, except under circumstances of emergency and martial state," that the government concluded that the law does not call for stronger obligatory commitments and for restricting conditions and prerequisites in the exercise of this right by participants in such assemblies. That is precisely the reason for which the requested legal resolutions are based on a looser interpretation of the respective commitments in the organization of public meetings, with the exception of areas affecting the inviolability of the life and health of the citizens, and the defense of the basic freedoms and rights and security of the state.

The author of the new version of the law calls for a more thorough definition of what is a public assembly, what are open-air or enclosed areas used for entertainment, cultural, religious, humanitarian, social, political, economic, sports, or similar interests of the citizens, organized for the purpose of a public expression of their views or to protest. At the same time, according to the law, a religious ceremony is not considered a public assembly if it is held in areas specifically designated for religious purposes, ordinary popular entertainment, and meetings of a cultural-entertainment or sports nature organized within an enclosed space earmarked for that

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purpose, as well as ordinary meetings, assemblies, seminars, and platforms used by representatives of political parties, state authorities and organizations, and juridical persons in the course of performing their activities.

**Responsibility of the Organizer**

For security reasons, the organizer of an assembly may notify the MVR on the holding of a public meeting and the measures which have been taken to hold said meeting. In this notification he must provide the program, time, and place of the assembly, the steps taken in connection with the free organization and development of the assembly and the stipulations governing the public order service. The MVR may terminate a public assembly if it threatens the life, health, security, and personal safety and property of the citizens, the commission or encouragement of a crime, a threat to the environment, or if such an assembly violates international treaties, which calls for unhindered development of traffic. Should an assembly result in causing damages, the organizer must compensate for said damages.

This relatively short draft law enables foreigners as well to organize public assemblies. However, they must publicize the assembly in advance and request a permit to hold it from the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

As is the case with any other law, the author of this law stipulates punitive clauses affecting juridical or physical persons who violate its stipulation. Thus, juridical persons (organizers of the public assembly) must pay a monetary fine ranging from four to twenty salary payments, while physical persons participating or organizing the assembly can be fined no more than 1/5 to 1/2 of the salary, or else serve a prison term not to exceed 30 days for committed violations.

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### Court Rules 140,000 Election Protests Justified

*WS0612152895 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 6 Dec 95 p 1*

[Report by Marek Domagalski: "Supreme Court on President-Elect's Education; 140,000 Justified Protests"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *"The Supreme Court has decided that the allegation regarding the provision of false information on the education of the presidential candidate, included in the election list drawn up by the State Electoral Commission, is justified and constitutes a violation of Article 43 of the law of 27 September on the election of the president of the Polish Republic. This violation of the law may have affected the result of the elections," stated one of the three-person teams of the Chamber for Administration, Labor, and Social Insurances of the Supreme Court about 43 protests.*

The Supreme Court also decided to justify 139,392 other protests regarding Kwasniewski's education. It also rejected 120 such protests. Yesterday, however, we failed to establish whether the different decision were caused by different evaluations of the situation or by different arguments submitted to support the protests. [passage omitted]

### Poll: Majority Against Invalidation of Election

*WS0512160095 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 5 Dec 95 p 2*

[Report by "slad": "Kwasniewski Guilty, but Elections Valid"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *A total of 593,238 protests over the presidential elections have been filed with the Supreme Court.*

Their authors demanded that the presidential elections be invalidated on the grounds that Aleksander Kwasniewski had supplied false information about himself.

More than half of the Poles claim that nothing should be done to invalidate the elections, even if the Supreme Court did find the charges brought against Aleksander Kwasniewski justified.

"It is not worth doing anything because the choice has already been made, and holding new elections would be very expensive," say 38 percent of those polled by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS]. A further 23 percent say "nothing should be done because it is not important anyway." Among those who are against any action being taken dominate people who cast their votes for Tadeusz Zielinski, Jacek Kuron, Waldemar Pawlak and, naturally, Aleksander Kwasniewski.

Every seventh person polled is convinced that the Supreme Court should invalidate the elections, and 14 percent claim Kwasniewski should give up the presidency of his own initiative. The latter opinion is most often voiced by Lech Walesa's electorate.

**Should the presidential elections be invalidated?**

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Taking action is not worthwhile because the choice has already been made, and holding new elections would be very expensive | 38 |
| Nothing should be done; it is not important | 23 |
| The Supreme Court should invalidate the election results | 15 |
| Aleksander Kwasniewski should give up the presidency of his own accord | 14 |
| Difficult to say | 10 |

### Poll: Kwasniewski Will Make Good President

*WS0412142795 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 4 Dec 95 p 1*

[Report by "MPO": "Will Aleksander Kwasniewski Make a Good President? Was Lech Walesa a Good President?"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

**Will Aleksander Kwasniewski make a good president?**

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 57 |
| No | 17 |
| Difficult to say | 26 |

**Was Lech Walesa a good president?**

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| Yes | 44 |
| No | 47 |
| Difficult to say | 9 |

The poll was carried out by the Center for Research on Public Opinion [OBOP] between 25 and 28 November 1995.

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* * *

"These results may be accounted for by a credit of trust," says OBOP's Doctor Tomasz Zukowski. "Anyone who wins the elections gets such credit from some of the citizens. People invest in the winner."

Walesa boosted his public image in the course of the election campaign. Back in March, a mere 24 percent of Poles approved of the way he performed as president, with 70 percent disapproving. According to 53 percent, it is very good that Kwasniewski has become president, while 35 percent claim the opposite.

Out of those polled, 35 percent claim that the antagonisms and conflicts that surfaced during the campaign will now die down, 36 percent expect them to flare up, and 19 percent think nothing will change. Those who most fear an escalation of conflict are supporters of the right, entrepreneurs, students, people with higher education, and the unemployed. Those who expect things will simmer down are predominantly Kwasniewski's supporters.

**Poll: Most Fear Left Wing's Monopoly on Power**

*WS0512131295 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 2-3 Dec 95 pp 1-2*

[Report by Ewa K. Czaczkowska: "Social Research Laboratory for RZECZPOSPOLITA; Poles Are Afraid of Monopoly on Power"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] *Since 19 November, nearly all of the powers—those of the president, the government, and the parliamentary majority—have been wielded by one political formation. This arouses fears among more than 50 percent of Poles. However, only one in five Poles believes that the presidency of Aleksander Kwasniewski will result in a return to the pre-1989 style of governing. Nearly three-fourths of adult Poles believe that the coalition government should include politicians representing opposition parties. Such opinions were expressed by respondents to a poll conducted by the Social Research Laboratory [PBS] a week after the second round of the elections.*

If by 9 December the Supreme Court rules that the election protests it has received are unfounded or that they are well-based but did not affect the results of the elections, the new president will be sworn into office on 23 December.

Aleksander Kwasniewski's victory undoubtedly strengthened the position of the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] on the political scene. Now the left wing not only dominates the Sejm and the governing coalition but has also taken over the office of the president. Such monopolization of powers by one political group arouses fears among more than half of adult Polish citizens—despite the announcement made by the president-elect, who resigned as chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic and even dropped his membership in the party—that he wants to be a president of all Poles. [passage omitted]

The respondents who are afraid that we may see the return of the pre-1989 style of wielding power are primarily elderly people, over age 59, who supported Lech Wales in both rounds of the presidential elections. The younger the voters are, the fewer fears they express. Such fears are not voiced by the electorate of Kwasniewski, Zielinski, Pawlak, Kuron, and most of those who voted for Jan Olszewski. [passage omitted]

The poll was conducted by PBS in Sopot on 25 and 26 November 1995 in a representative group of 1,060 adult inhabitants of Poland.

**Now that it won the presidential elections, one political formation has all the power. Does this not arouse your fears?**

| | Percent |
|---|---|
| It arouses great fears | 28 |
| It arouses moderate fears | 26 |
| It does not arouse any fears | 39 |
| Hard to tell | 7 |

**Prime Minister: Government Goals Remain Unchanged**

*LD0512161295 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1401 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 5 Dec (PAP)—Against the background of various campaigns, criticism, and suspicion, one must believe in statements in which the government says that its entire activity has been directed toward invariable goals, said Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy today at a meeting with representatives of regional press.

He mentioned, among other things, consolidation of the dynamics of economic growth, active privatization, social security and health reforms, and improvement in housing construction. He also confirmed that Polish foreign policy will remain unchanged.

Irrespective of all weaknesses of which we have been aware, of what must be speeded up or consulted with other partners, the preelection coalition program is being implemented, the prime minister said. He added, however, that his Cabinet does not deny what

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is "weak and wrong" because "weaknesses should lead to common thinking."

According to the prime minister, there has been a dispute in the country about mass enfranchisement of the nation. "We do not ignore a general dimension of privatization process for the citizens because this is the most important economic issue after the 1989 turning point. We simply have a different view on the scale of mass participation in privatization," Oleksy said. In the prime minister's view this dispute is not caused by diverging positions as regards the social goal of privatization.

Journalists from regional television stations asked the prime minister to comment on speculation about a proposal to sell 51 percent of shares of local television centers to private owners. Labor Minister Leszek Miller, who was present at the meeting, gave an assurance that the finance minister would block any such proposal.

Asked about the involvement of top civil servants in private business activity, Oleksy said that trustees should be appointed to administer their assets as long as they remain in public office in order to remove suspicions about their activity. "I myself would like to give some shares to a trustee, but I cannot because, according to the regulations in force, only assets valued at over 1 billion old zlotys can be put in trust. I do not have that much and I cannot buy more," he said.

The prime minister appealed to journalists to perform their "journalistic service" with particular care for a good and honest flow of information.

**Foreign Minister Sums Up Term of Office**

*LD0512163895 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Minister Wladyslaw Bartoszewski told journalists in Lublin that, while in charge of foreign policy, he continued the policy of Minister Skubiszewski. Minister Bartoszewski expressed the hope that this line of foreign policy would continue after his departure.

[Begin Bartoszewski recording] I think that during my term of office we achieved the consolidation of our policy both in view of the West and the East. After all, the diplomatic contacts with Bonn and Moscow, with Washington and Jerusalem, with France and the Scandinavian countries, and with Rome and the Holy See have not looked bad during recent months. They confirmed the foreign policy directions as initiated by Minister Skubiszewski in 1989 and that I followed.

I can only express the hope and confidence that this policy will be continued because I can see no alternative. On several occasions, both at home and abroad, Prime Minister Oleksy also gave assurances as to the continuation. I have no grounds to negate the assurances of the prime minister. [end recording]

**Walesa: 'Dubiously Lost' Election Not a Disaster**

*LD0512183295 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1723 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 5 Dec—During Tuesday's meeting with the Warsaw election committee, President Lech Walesa said that it would be difficult to consider a dubiously lost election a disaster. The president stressed that the opponents "went for broke, using all possible methods from scientific sociological techniques to simple lies."

Walesa said that one must not feel offended with the electorate and abandon those who still have trust in him. "Their votes put us under the obligation; the struggle for our homeland's future continues, and we must not back out," the president said.

Over 500 people attended the meeting with the president held at the Brodno district cultural center.

**Aides Interviewed on Walesa's Political Plans**

*WS0612094295 Warsaw GAZETA SWIATECZNA in Polish 25-26 Nov 95 pp 8-9*

[Interview with Andrzej Zakrzewski, minister of state in the President's Chancellery, and Presidential Spokesman Marek Karpinski, by Agnieszka Kublik; place and date not given: "Sulejowek Has Various Meanings"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kublik] In other words, Walesa will not become an ordinary citizen after 22 December...

[Zakrzewski] Perhaps Jerzy Urban [former communist government spokesman, now chief editor of NIE] would like to see Lech Walesa as a private person only. Walesa himself, because of his past, political plans, as well as social expectations, particularly those that have been formulated in recent days, cannot disappoint people's hopes. People are hoping that he will once again try to integrate the post-Solidarity, independence-minded camp. I am now thinking not only of those groups that took part in the Round Table talks, but also those that acted at the same time as Solidarity ["S"] as well as those that were formed in the last decade. After all, it was Walesa himself, not any platform, that united this camp at the end of the president's term of office. After the first round of the elections, his political support was the same as the backing he received when he started, or perhaps the same as even earlier than that. His position

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in "S" is exactly the same as it was when he was its chairman.

[Kublik] I am afraid you are too optimistic; after all, these forces grouped around Walesa only after the first round, when it was already clear that it was necessary to endorse Walesa to vote against Kwasniewski. Aside from that, before the second round, not all of the post-Solidarity candidates appealed to their voters to vote for the incumbent president. Finally, this may only be a temporary coalition.

[Karpinski] There is no other person whom this camp will accept and back, even now that the second round has been held. [passage omitted]

[Karpinski] Walesa has managed to construct what others have failed to build since 1989. He is not a destroyer, he is a builder.

[Zakrzewski] You [talking to the journalist] see either a black or white Walesa. Walesa is full of color; he is live and unconventional. The question is whether there is demand for such a politician in Poland today. I believe there is because we will soon get bored with the plastic world like the one we see in commercials, as well as with the ever-present smile.

[Kublik] A day after the elections Walesa announced that he would travel all over Poland and that Kwasniewski was in for a bumpy ride.

[Zakrzewski] I can only try to guess what he meant. He will evaluate Kwasniewski's actions. Any politician is allowed to do this. It is even his duty because, after all, he was supported by half of the Poles. Incidentally, can you imagine that such a person can all of a sudden disappear from the political scene?

[Kublik] That is not what I am asking. At one point Walesa says that there will be no brawls, and a moment later he says he will punch someone in the jaw. What will actually happen?

[Zakrzewski] Let us leave this unfortunate jaw to a dentist. Walesa said this less than 24 hours after the elections. Journalists were asking aggressive questions.

[Kublik] Are you, gentlemen, going to continue to work for Lech Walesa after 22 December?

[Zakrzewski] Yes, we are. We have already declared that, after submitting our resignations, we are prepared to stay with him.

[Kublik] In that case, can you say that Sulejowek [place where Marshal Pilsudski in 1930's retired and from which he later returned to the political scene] is possible in the case of Walesa?

[Zakrzewski] Walesa is not Piludski, Gdansk is not Sulejowek. I will say one thing: The list of political guests who are visiting Walesa is today much longer than it was before 19 November.

[Karpinski] We must say two things about Sulejowek: It was a place where Pilsudski retired and a place from which he came back. Walesa will certainly have a place where he can retire; we will see whether he has a place from which he will come back. [passage omitted] Good intentions are not enough here—it is enough to look at election results in military districts. Lech Walesa will not bring troops out in the streets or encourage people to build barricades because this is not a good time for that and these are not good methods. I believe that he should be a mentor for the political scene. [passage omitted]

### Protest of Editor's Dismissal Gains Wider Support

*WS0512151995 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 5 Dec 95 p 3*

[Report by "MPO": "The Media; Protests in Defense of the Free Press"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 6 December, ZYCIE WARSZAWY employees are to stop work for two hours. On 10 December, they will not work for the entire day.

The official reason for both strikes held by the editorial office's Solidarity is a conflict with the publisher that has been going on for a year now. The dispute pertains to working conditions and pay. Members of the editorial staff do not hide, however, that the decision to hold a strike at this particular time is a reaction to the plans of dismissing the chief editor. After the presidential elections, the Italian publisher began sending signals that Nicola Grauso is not happy with the stance ZYCIE WARSZAWY took in the campaign, namely that it criticized Aleksander Kwasniewski.

The ZYCIE WARSZAWY Solidarity Strike Committee points out that economic considerations cannot be the reason for Grauso's dissatisfaction with the chief editor. During the presidential campaign, the daily's circulation nearly doubled—without any advertising campaign. "The dismissal of the chief editor is 'punishment' for the fact that our daily revealed scandals involving members of the ruling camp, most of all the Polisa affair, in which the president-elect himself was directly involved," state activists of the editorial office's Solidarity.

Statements of support have been issued by heads of the Czestochowa, Middle-East, Slask Opolski, and Mazowsze chapters of the union as well the Solidarity

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Committee at the Wola Machinery Plants-Polish Aviation Plants. "We see the coup in ZYCIE WARSZAWY as an attempt at gaining control over the free media by the postcommunist camp," said Maciej Jankowski, head of Solidarity's Mazowsze Chapter. The protesters have also won the support of the Mazowsze-based Kontra Trade Union, closely affiliated with the Confederation for an Independent Poland.

Moreover, the protest has also been backed by politicians: Artur Balazs and Jozef Slisz (Peasant-Christian Party), Aleksander Hall (Conservative Party), Wieslaw Chrzanowski (Christian-National Union), Hanna Suchocka, Jan Rokita, Bronislaw Komorowski, and Donald Tusk (all of the Freedom Union). "We consider it our duty to draw public attention to the politically inspired attempt at dismissing the chief editor of ZYCIE WARSZAWY immediately after the presidential campaign, in which the daily edited by Tomasz Wolek frequently placed the Democratic Left Alliance Leader in an uncomfortable position," they wrote.

### Ministry Official Views Capital Privatization

*WS0512155895 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 25-26 Nov 95 p 14*

[Interview with Adam Kowalczyk, director of the Capital Privatization Department in the Privatization Ministry, by Andrzej Leszczynski; place and date not given: "Regarding the Transfer List"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Leszczynski] Last March, if my memory serves me correctly, journalists received a transfer list from your ministry. Has it been drawn up on the same basis as the well-known transfer list of soccer players?

[Kowalczyk] The document we refer to as the transfer list presents companies that are under the Privatization Ministry and that are being already prepared for capital privatization, which simply means that their shares will be sold. However, privatization is not a sports event. It is a process whose results affect the entire economy. We cannot look at it through the prism of the number of companies sold.

[Leszczynski] How, then, can we assess the course of privatization?

[Kowalczyk] To do this, we should look at the entire process, in the long run, and take into account many criteria. Capital privatization enhances the effectiveness of companies and, as a consequence, speeds up social transformations. Investors guarantee appropriate supervision over the functioning of a given company; they supply modern technologies and provide professional management know-how. However, they first of all ensure inflow of capital to the company as well as to the state budget.

[Leszczynski] I gather that you want to use positive changes brought about by privatization as a gauge of its progress. Nonetheless, we probably cannot evade the question of how much of the national wealth is being privatized and how much money the process is yielding.

[Kowalczyk] Over five years, approximately 150 companies have undergone capital privatization; 66 of them were privatized in the last two years—between November 1993 and 30 October 1995. However, you are right in asking me how much national wealth has been privatized and how much money this process has yielded because it is impossible to assess the privatization progress only on the basis of information regarding the number of companies sold.

An equally important element of this evaluation is the final price of the privatized company, costs of this privatization, and the investment commitments made by the investor.

Let me give you a fairly characteristic example. The year 1993 saw the biggest number of sales—as many as 48 companies were sold. This yielded approximately 4.5 trillion old zlotys to the state budget. However, in 1994 only 39 companies were sold, but the receipts from these sales exceeded 8.6 trillion old zlotys. We began privatizing bigger companies; on the one hand, this is more difficult, but, on the other, yields bigger profits. The most profitable transactions this year were the sale of the Winiary plant in Kalisz for 178.08 million zlotys [Z], the Ozarow cement mill in the Tarnobrzeg Voivodship for Z140.6 million, and the Kujawy Cement-Lime Company for Z107.63 million. At the same time, privatization costs are going down. In 1993 as much as 376 billion old zlotys were spent, whereas in 1994 268 million [currency not specified].

Another criterion in this evaluation are investment commitments made by investors. In 1993 they amounted to 3,841 billion old zlotys, while in 1994 to 6,750 billion old zlotys. This year's investment commitments have already exceeded the sum of 6,850 billion old zlotys. As you can see, privatization should be assessed from more than one point of view.

[Leszczynski] Nonetheless, this does not change the fact that the best result—the sale of 48 companies in one year—has not been improved so far...

[Kowalczyk] That is true, but sales were not drastically limited. As I have already said, in 1994 we privatized 39 companies, and this year, until the end of October, 17.

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[Leszczynski] As far as I remember, the plans envisioned the sale of 30 firms. Will you be able to privatize so many companies? The year is coming to an end.

[Kowalczyk] You see, it is usually so that negotiations are concluded at the end of the third or the fourth quarter of the year. So far we have privatized 17 companies for 7.6 billion old zlotys—let us stick to the old currency to avoid confusion. Because I know how the negotiations are going, I believe that by the end of the year we will privatize 30 or even more companies and that the revenues will double in comparison with last year's revenues.

[Leszczynski] How about the ministry's plans regarding the privatization of the most widely known companies? Could you give us any specific examples?

[Kowalczyk] We will sell the shares of the Piast brewery in Wroclaw, as well as the breweries in Lezajsk and Glubczyce. I should also mention Apena in Bielsko-Biala, Chemar in Kielce, POLMO in Praszka, Light Metals Plant in Kety, and the Konin Aluminum Plant.

I would also like to say that this year we will privatize the Hortensja foundry in Piotrkow Trybunalski, the Meat Processing Plant in Jaroslaw, and others. A big event will be the privatization of the tobacco industry at the end of this year and the beginning of next year.

[Leszczynski] Thus, let us assume that you will finally privatize those 30 companies or you will even exceed this number. Nonetheless, it will still be fewer than last year. Why?

[Kowalczyk] This process is more and more difficult. Practically most of the companies that are manufacturing things sold directly on the market have already been privatized. These were real tidbits for both Polish and foreign investors. Now we are beginning to privatize companies that manufacture capital goods, construction firms, chemical plants manufacturing products for industry—all these companies are far more difficult to privatize. Moreover, we have to cope with ecological problems. When we want to privatize a chemical or some other plant that is a threat to the natural environment, there arises the problem of to what extent the State Treasury should share with the new proprietor the responsibility for polluting the environment.

In recent months, privatization has been impeded by the fact that the new law on commercialization and privatization of companies still could not enter into force. Vetoed by the president, it is waiting for the Constitutional Tribunal to decide its fate. I must say that this law includes many solutions that are favorable to employees. Thus, many state-owned companies are waiting for the new law and prefer to postpone privatization to a later time.

[Leszczynski] Over the past two years, new tendencies have appeared. Fewer shares have been offered to the public [on the Stock Market]. Polish companies have been more active participants in the privatization processes. How would you comment on this?

[Kowalczyk] The reason fewer shares have been offered to the public is that in the period in question the Stock Market was going through some hard times, which did not encourage people to buy shares there. This is the first, most important reason. We are trying to change this situation by selling shares partially to the public and partially to strategic investors.

You are also asking me about the reason that Polish companies are now more willing to buy the shares of companies that are being privatized. The companies that are now active in the privatization processes are first of all those firms whose shares were sold on the Stock Market right after privatization in Poland began. I am thinking about such companies as Elektrim, Mostostal Export, Universal, Rafako, and others. This means that privatization is already beginning to yield concrete results—the Polish capital market is maturing.

[Leszczynski] At the same time, an increasing number of consortia, made up of several firms, are taking part in the privatization processes.

[Kowalczyk] That is correct. This results from the fact that companies that have capital should cooperate with those that know how to run a company and that have appropriate technologies. Incidentally, the aforementioned Polish companies listed on the Stock Market are active members of such consortia.

Taking into account all these facts, I can tell you in conclusion that my evaluation of the results of the capital privatization—carried out this year and in the future—is optimistic. Things will be more difficult, which does not necessarily mean less efficient privatization—less efficient in the broad meaning of this word.

### Statisticians Warn of Dangers of Low Birthrate

*WS0412142995 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 4 Dec 95 p 1*

[Report by "RAS": "Demographic Shock Looming Over Poland"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The population of Poland is to rise by 44,000 this year. This is the lowest indicator in postwar Poland (in 1984, population growth was still an upward trend and rose by 371,000). The birthrate is thus declining for a successive year.

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The current birthrate is 0.11 percent, half of what it was in 1990.

"If it goes down below 0.1 percent, we will have a demographic shock," says Lucyna Nowak, director of the Demographic Department at the Central Office of Statistics [GUS].

A recent report published by GUS, "The Demographic Situation in Poland in the 1990's," states that the number of marriages and births has been decreasing for more than 10 years. Young people get married less often because of difficulties in finding jobs (which makes supporting a family impossible) and problems with getting apartments.

Young couples rarely decide to have more than one child for economic reasons. This year, some 450,000 children will be born (the lowest number since 1945).

The "birthrate depression" causes a generational stagnation. This leads to an abrupt aging of society.

After the year 2010, the baby boomers of the 1950's will reach retirement age. (More than 700,000 babies annually were born in that decade).

"Now is the best time to lay down the foundations for a social infrastructure, to create pension plans and so on so that we are not taken by surprise in a few years," says Lucyna Nowak.

At the same time, by the year 2000 an additional million baby boomers from the 1970's will appear on the labor market. Unless the economic situation changes, they will join the ranks of the unemployed. And by 2005, a further million will appear.

The population of Poland is to reach 38,624,000 by the end of the year. In the year 2000, there will be just barely under 39 million Poles, and in 2010 40 million. The next demographic explosion is expected after 2005.

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**Vacaroiu Views FRY Economic Cooperation Plans**

*AU0512205595 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 30 Nov 95 pp 1, 4*

[Interview with Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu by Liana Simion in Bucharest on 29 November: "It Is Natural That the Countries That Had Losses Due to the Embargo Should Be in the Front Line in the Economic Reconstruction of the Former Yugoslav Area, States Prime Minister Nicolae Vacaroiu Following His Visit to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Simion] Mr. Prime Minister, you had the chance of being the very first foreign official to pay a visit, at the highest level, to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY] after the lifting of the embargo. I do not know whether you noticed, but some of our political and economic analysts signaled the intent of a group of Western countries to invest $5-6 billion in the former Yugoslav region. It seems that "the battle for the recovery of former Yugoslavia's economy" has already started. Do you believe that the trump cards you obtained as a result of this visit will offer Romania the chance to stay in the front line in the offensive for the economic reconstruction of the former Yugoslav area?

[Vacaroiu] There is no doubt about the fact that the international finance and banking institutions will participate in the postconflict reconstruction projects in the Yugoslav region. As far as Romania is concerned, our visit in the FRY was intended, above all, to keep up and further our political dialogue. Second, we discussed the issue of continuing and finalizing the peace process, because now the Dayton accord is initialed and it is to be signed in Paris, including the clarification of certain more delicate aspects, such as the borders and holding free elections in the countries in question. A third element of our talks was Romania's offensive to participate in the entire economic reconstruction process in the former Yugoslav area, which in our opinion is a very important aspect. I would like to point out that in this issue there are two ways to act.

[Simion] Which are they?

[Vacaroiu] First, a request should be made by the neighboring countries, which suffered losses due to the embargo, and which received practically nothing as compensation for their immense losses. It is natural that these countries should be in the front line in the postconflict economic reconstruction process. Romania has good potential in all domains, but especially in that of infrastructure, town building, and civil engineering, and therefore, it could involve itself intensively in those sectors. And I am not referring solely to the FRY, but also to the other countries, which directly suffered huge human and material losses caused by the conflict in that region. This would be the first way to act. Beginning today (yesterday—editor's note) talks are to commence, at the level of state secretaries, between Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania on the aforementioned issues.

[Simion] But you said there were two ways....

[Vacaroiu] The second way to act is to directly involve Romania in the economic reconstruction of the former Yugoslav area, on the basis of the potential and the principled relations we had during the three years of the embargo. We are envisaging direct contacts also with Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Slovenia. In the first half of December we might be present in that region at the request of the prime ministers of the countries in question. Besides this, we could also participate indirectly, by mediation of certain partners, such as those in the FRY. But I would like to reiterate the great importance for us of having direct relations with the FRY.

[Simion] Why is that so important?

[Vacaroiu] Because we used to have a great number of cooperation actions and joint ventures which were taking shape and which have been frozen since 1992. I would illustrate this with the Solventul factory in Timisoara; the Pancevo plant; our cooperation in aviation; in the field of transportation means, such as buses, trucks, and city and land automobiles; but also our large-scale exchanges in the iron and steel, chemical, and oil-processing industries. As new elements, which emerged during our talks there, I could mention our offer on participation in the rebuilding process of certain transportation ways, such as railways, road modernization, delivery of railway wagons, aluminum production and manufacturing, and other such things, which includes a wide range of domains. One thing is certain, namely, that during the direct talks held at the level of company heads, who had appointments parallel to those of the official delegation (with the participation of representatives of various ministries,) they managed to work out several actions, which will yield good results. They already concluded contracts amounting to $14 million, as well as precontracts [precontracte] worth $50 million. This is a good start and the credits for it go to the companies rather than us. They are the ones who have to initiate direct contacts with partners in the former Yugoslav region. Joint ventures are to be set up in the domains of transportation means, heavy-duty and light vehicles, and buses, as well as in rail and road transportation.

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The field of chemistry and oil-processing is to be tackled later on. Our and our hosts' intent is to grant them concrete support by processing in Romanian refineries the crude oil needed by the Yugoslav party. The issue of the general overhauling of the Iron Gates I electricity plant also cropped up. In my opinion, we approached all these issues in a correct manner. Let us not forget that at the end of 1992 our commercial exchanges amounted to about $400 million. The perspectives, about which I talked with Prime Minister Radoje Kontic, seem to indicate the possibility of reaching a volume of commercial exchanges amounting to $1 billion. During our talks focused on economic issues, President Slobodan Milosevic mentioned the fact that currently Yugoslavia does not intend to start investing again in production facilities that would require exceptional expenditures. He illustrated this with their oil refineries and asked us to use Romanian refineries to process their crude oil. In the iron and steel industry our talks referred to light shapes [profiluri usoare], reinforcing bars, bar strips, but also other products in the manufacturing of which Romania is to become their partner number one. Last, but not least, I would mention their request for cooperation, by means of joint ventures, in the domains of light industry, textile products, and even wood processing. The perspectives that were outlined seem to be good, and we, in the government, will have to see to it that everything we pledged to do is achieved indeed.

I am not referring solely to the accords that are currently being worked out or already signed. There is also a great number of restrictions imposed over the past three years, such as the border crossing taxes, the taxes imposed on physical persons, or the opening of new border crossing points. Traffic will be very intense, and therefore we also examined the road traffic issue. We also discussed the possibility of resorting to river transportation and of setting up joint-venture transportation companies specialized in Danube River transportation. We will use the free ports of Bar, respectively in the Black Sea area.

As you may have noticed, the economic dimension was the essential component of our talks I held during my two-day visit there. Exceptionally significant is also the fact that the talks were quite concrete. Our job, the government's job, was to set up a favorable framework to be used by the economic factors, and therefore this was the issue we approached most seriously. Aside from this, in my talks with the presidents of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro, we approached aspects that referred to intensifying our political dialogue, and we even agreed on a work schedule of two meetings each year, at the prime ministers' level, to check how the programs agreed upon are being implemented. The foreign affairs and trade ministers were assigned the job of listing everything we agreed upon during this visit, and to work out immediate intervention programs should perturbations appear.

[Simion] If I am right, you also discussed the issue of setting up a joint private bank....

[Vacaroiu] Constantin Duna, the chairman of the Romanian Banking Association (ARB,) accompanied us in his double capacity as head of the ARB, but also chairman of the Ion Tiriac [private] bank. He led the negotiations intended to rapidly set up a joint private bank headquartered in Bucharest and Belgrade and with a branch in Timisoara. This would allow for more expeditious payments and a higher fluency of the financial operations.

[Simion] At the official level you have made the opening move and outlined the macroeconomic shape of the future cooperation. What do you expect from the almost 40 businessmen in the parallel delegation, which was even more numerous than that of the government?

[Vacaroiu] My expectations with respect to them are very high. They will be the basis in the future. The government merely creates preconditions, a framework that fosters cooperation actions, while the businessmen's job is to concretely carry out cooperation.

**Official Says Rail Traffic With FRY Normalized**

*LD0512142895 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1225 GMT 5 Nov 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bucharest, Dec. 5 (TANJUG)—Romania has normalized rail traffic with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], Romanian State Secretary Stefan Mihailesku said on Tuesday [5 November].

Romania has informed all neighboring and other railway companies about this, and increased the number of trains to Yugoslavia from the pre-sanction three to 10-12 during this week.

Before the imposition of the sanctions on Yugoslavia, daily rail traffic between the two countries was 15 trains.

The office of the Yugoslav railways in Bucharest also informed all economic organizations and representation offices in Romania that they can count on Yugoslav and Romanian railways in the transport of both export or import goods.

The Romanian Danube fleet and the administration of the Romanian part of the Danube-Black Sea canal are also preparing for the full normalization of transport.

Stefan Sevastian, the director of the canal which shortens the water route to the Black Sea, said that the lifting

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of the sanctions for river traffic is the biggest gift the river fleet could expect this year.

**PRM's Tudor Expects To 'Die a President'**

*AU0512085695 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 28 Nov 95 p 4*

[Report by Cristina Wlassopol: "Corneliu Vadim Tudor States in the Senate: I Was Not Born a Senator, I Will Not Die a Senator, but I Will Probably Die a President"]

[FBIS Translated Text] During yesterday's proceedings of the Senate, Ion Solcanu (of the Social Democracy Party of Romania), the chairman of the meeting, read out a request from the justice minister to have Corneliu Vadim Tudor's (of the Greater Romania Party) [PRM] parliamentary immunity lifted. We note that the General Prosecuting Magistracy has also pressed charges. The justice minister's accusation against Corneliu Tudor is: "Offense against the public authorities by publishing some articles referring to President Ion Iliescu and SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] Director Virgil Magureanu." After casting their votes, the senators agreed that, according to Senate regulations, the request to have the immunity lifted had to be forwarded to the Judicial Commission for Appointments, Discipline, and Immunity, which is to investigate the validity of the accusations in the Vadim Tudor file. Similarly, it was decided that this Commission had to establish the deadline by which it is to issue its position on the file. Further, Tudor said: "I was not born a senator and I will not die a senator, but I will probably die a president." Similarly, the PRM leader thanked his former friend Iosif Chiuzbaian [justice minister] for giving him such a birthday present, namely, the request to have his parliamentary immunity lifted. As was natural, the PRM leader said that he could not accept the justice minister's "present" because "it has no subject," as "neither the justice minister nor the General Prosecuting Magistracy have produced any proof that I am the author of those articles." In the same fashion, the PRM senator accused Prosecutor Marian Capota of corruption and of acting "hastily" in forwarding the file without hearing all the witnesses first. In any event, Tudor expressed his belief that the justice minister's request was anticonstitutional, because "nobody is above the law and we are all equals before it." Wishing to prove his innocence, the PRM senator asked the Judicial Commission also to investigate SRI Colonel Ilie Merce, who allegedly said that "President Ion Iliescu and the SRI director put extraordinary pressure on Mr. Chiuzbaian." At the same time, the PRM leader said that this request had been worked out immediately after the party's plenary meeting, when he was appointed as a presidential candidate. Saying that this was the first day of dictatorship in the new history of Romania, Corneliu Vadim Tudor asked that the meeting to discuss the issue of lifting his immunity should be held at Christmas, which sees "the sixth anniversary of Ceausescu's monstrous assassination."

Jumping to his colleague's assistance, Adrian Paunescu (of the Socialist Party of Labor) said that the file containing the request to have Vadim Tudor's parliamentary immunity lifted "was worked out at a rapid pace."

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### Drnovsek on EU's Failure To Discuss Slovenia

*AU0512110195 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 2100 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] [Studio announcer] Let us now listen to some of the excerpts from an interview that Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek gave for Television Slovenia tonight. One of the questions concerned the Slovene recognition of FRY:

[Begin Drnovsek recording] On the Serbian side, too, there is probably quite a lot of revanchism and probably a lot of emotion too. Their propaganda has been painting Slovenia in very black colors for a long time, and many people will probably raise their voices, saying, what business can we have with Slovenia at all and implying that there are some major historic grudges between us. However, the business interest always finds ways of realizing itself, and I expect that the companies here and there will find the links that are functional. It is difficult to say at the moment how many there will be, however, there is evidently an interest in the economy. [end recording]

[Studio announcer] One of the question to Dr. Drnovsek also concerned the session of the EU foreign ministers in Brussels today:

[Begin Drnovsek recording] It is true that the ministers held a session today. I was not as optimistic as one might deduce from your words. However, we did put a certain pressure on Brussels, on the ministerial council, that today's session would nevertheless adopt a clear-cut decision regarding Slovenia. As the whole affair has been dragging on for quite some time, we have lately exercised a rather intense diplomatic pressure on the outside. We also acted via various invisible channels, and also with the public announcements such as the one I made, namely, that I expected that the ministers of the European Council would debate this matter and show their cards. However, this evidently did not happen. It most definitely did not happen because of the repeated objection by Italy. [end recording]

[Studio announcer] The EU foreign ministers, therefore, did not discuss the signing of the agreement on Slovenia's associate membership in the union at today's session in Brussels. As the chairman, the head of Spanish diplomacy Javier Solana, said after the meeting, the reason for it lay in the unwillingness of Ljubljana and Rome to strike a compromise deal. The ministers devoted the greatest attention to the realization of the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

### Parliamentary Commission Debates FRY Recognition

*AU0512173695 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Prior to the afternoon continuation of the extraordinary State Chamber session at which the deputies will discuss recent recognition of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] and take a vote on the law on abolition of sanctions against the FRY and, under certain conditions, also against the Serbian territories in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the commission for international relations met early this afternoon. According to the commission chairman, Borut Pahor, the session will try to resolve these dilemmas. The session was also attended by Foreign Minister Zoran Thaler. Here is a report by Nadja Pengov:

[Begin recording] The foreign minister repeated some of the explanations at the commission session. The countries involved in the war in the Balkans will mutually recognize each other on 14 December in Paris. The circumstances have changed after Dayton, and with the decision on the recognition, Slovenia ensures that it will able to act unburdened at the peace conference. Foreign Minister Thaler says that, because of the government's decision, it will not be possible to throw Slovenia into the same basket. However, parallel to this—and he reiterated the point—our attitude toward the succession and the continuity of the disintegrated Yugoslavia remains unchanged, which means that all currently existing countries are equal successors. As he said, the four successor countries today informed the UN Security Council that they were opposed to any sort of FRY continuity.

The commission also tackled the question of whose responsibility the recognition of new countries is—the government's or the State Chamber's—from a legal viewpoint. Thaler says that in international practice this is done by the government. The fact that in our country the State Chamber has performed this action thus far is a result of special consequences. According to him, it would be right if we resolved this dilemma in the parliament. However, he added, this is for all future cases and not retroactively, because [amending] the latter would do little good to the reputation of our country.

Commission Chairman Borut Pahor, therefore, opened the debate with the proposed motion according to which the government would be charged with the preparation of changes to the law on foreign affairs; this law would, among other things, also specify who in Slovenia is responsible for recognizing countries and establishing diplomatic relations. Pahor believes that the law on the

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suspension of sanctions, on which the State Chamber is expected to decide today, and recognition are not mutually linked. While he favors the parliament passing the law today, he believes there are also reasons against the recognition of Belgrade since it purports to be the sole successor of the former Yugoslavia.

So, what do the deputies say? Marjan Podobnik from the Slovene Peoples' Party has nothing against recognition; he only wonders why such haste. The foreign minister has not convinced him with his reasons. Slovenia is the only country that recognized Belgrade before the signing of the peace agreement, he says.

Ivo Hvalica, from the Social Democratic Party, also does not know the true reasons for it, likewise Polonca Dobrajc from the Slovene National Party. They are both convinced that this was done because the Slovene Government suffered a debacle in the European Union and would now like to divert attention elsewhere. The session is still under way. [end recording]

### Sanctions Against FRY Lifted

*AU0512214995 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[Report by Dragoslav Kosaric from Ljubljana]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following a four-hour, not too fierce debate dominated by interparty interests, the Slovene State Chamber an hour ago passed a law lifting economic sanctions against the FRY.

Only four deputies voted against this law; the Slovene People's Party, which proposed that the law should not come into force until the peace agreement was signed in Paris, failed to get support in the State Chamber. It is interesting to note that this time, even the opposition parties, which on Friday obstructed the voting on this law, now, because of the general feeling in the Slovene public, favored both the debate and the law.

Thus, as many as 60 percent of Slovenes polled on the issue supported normalizing relations with the FRY. We might add that only Zmago Jelincic's Slovene National Party maintained a consistent stance and urged the State Chamber to pass the law.

The lifting of sanctions and the recognition of our country by Slovenia will open doors for the future furthering of bilateral relations and economic cooperation.

### SFRY Assets Remain Frozen

*AU0412195695 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 4 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari, National Bank Governor France Arhar, and other members of our delegation announced today at a news conference in Ljubljana that the United States still supported Slovenia's efforts to solve the problem of the assets and the debts of former Yugoslavia. They also announced that the finance ministers of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Slovenia would be discussing this issue in Ljubljana next week. Here is a report by Suzana Kos:

[Begin recording] It is known that, parallel to the efforts to solve the problem of the division of the debts of the former joint state, Slovenia has striven to keep the former foreign currency reserves frozen following the suspension of sanctions against FRY. This is supposed to happen in the United States, Switzerland, Germany, and Austria, while it seems, on the other hand, that Great Britain will be acting differently.

Activities over the succession, that is, the division of the assets of the former joint federal state, should be harmonized. For that reason, the finance ministers of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia will be meeting in Ljubljana in the middle of next week.

As for the debts of the former federal state, our side has already worked out a general agreement on the division of obligations with the representatives of the majority of creditors. All foreign commercial bank creditors, approximately 400 of them all together, will be informed of our proposals and the agreement over the next 10 days. Our side then hopes to secure a consensus for the implementation of the agreement, which must come from the owners of two thirds of the debt. Slovenia is expected to pay 18 percent of just over $4 billion of the outstanding obligations toward the foreign commercial banks. Apart from the above countries, which acknowledge Slovenia's efforts, we should not forget the IMF. This institution maintains a well known pattern on the division of obligations. With it, Slovenia was allocated slightly more than 16 percent. This proportion can be contested in court; however, as our representatives pointed out at today's news conference, so far nobody has instigated such a procedure. [end recording]

### Peterle Explains Reasons for Early Elections

*AU0512153895 Ljubljana MLADINA in Slovene 28 Nov 95 pp 17-19*

[Interview with Lojze Peterle, president of the Slovene Christian Democratic Party, by Matija Grah; place and date not given: "Elections, Please"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Grah] What led you to the decision to propose the calling of the early elections

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to both coalition partners and all other parliamentary parties?

[Peterle] The main reason was our political analysis of what might happen in Slovenia a year before the elections, in the situation where the electoral campaign has practically started already and when we are witnessing declining dynamics of decisionmaking in several departments. Especially in the realm of foreign affairs, certain crucial matters have not been resolved, and it also does not appear that they would be resolved with the current policy. I am speaking about the relations with Italy, Croatia, and the EU. The circumstances have also changed in the economy, which Slovene foreign policy either did not acknowledge or perhaps even failed to reckon with. All in all, it would be harmful for Slovenia if we did not make the correct moves, that is, if we postponed the decisions for the entire year that still separates us from the elections.

[Grah] Can you be more specific?

[Peterle] There has been no progress on the key issues in foreign policy. Instead of diplomatic resourcefulness, we are listening to moral judgments being passed about the EU and our neighbors. The economic policy, which must still be in the character of transition, will find it difficult to be systematic rather than interventionist (I am not speaking about the macroeconomic aspect). The changes in the social sphere that would create a stable system are not happening. The Christian Democratic Party does not want pensioners wondering each month whether their pensions will arrive on time or not. We want a stable system. The postponement of the resolution of these issues only means bigger problems later.

One thing is the nonimplementation of the government program, another that, in many ways, the government coalition does not respect the rules customary for the coalition culture. The fact is that one often cannot predict what the Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS] will do. Its president does not know when he has a majority and when not. He never says to me: "I have 20 or 30 deputies." He always says: "I will try to convince them." For me, this is not a reply befitting the president of a partner party. When I go for talks, I say: "I have 15 deputies for this proposal." In the absence of this fundamental reliability, there can be no assurances as to where the government policy might led. Or, for example, the already comic fact: The government is opposed to the law on a temporary moratorium on the restitution of the [Catholic] church forests, while, at the same time, the prime minister's party has helped to put this law on the agenda on three occasions.

[Grah] Your reply radiates considerable distrust in the state-forming intentions of the government parties. You accuse them, so to speak, that, in the electoral year, they will not be—actually, that to a degree they are already not—capable of heading the state responsibly until the end of the mandate, and because of this fact early elections should be called....

[Peterle] We are pointing to a real problem a year before the elections and to the consequences of the situation that is emerging. I believe that this is an entirely realistic assessment and that this is how the people generally see it. We are not interested in playing electoral tricks or dropping firecrackers. We would not have embarked on the project of early elections had we not had some serious reasons. You know that we were opposed to early elections a year ago. After everything that has happened, however, we believe it would be unwise to continue with this situation throughout the year.

[Grah] Do you also see any reasons that speak against early elections? For example, a halt in our rapprochement with the EU because of the coming six-month electoral period....

[Peterle] I do not draw my reasons from the fact that the Croatians and the Austrians have decided for early elections and that the Italians will probably do it, too. I draw my reasons from the domestic situation. If early elections take place, this will only facilitate our rapprochement with the EU, as, otherwise, the negotiations will be at a standstill for a whole year. The businesses are sending a warning, the Slovene Academy of Arts and Sciences has sent a warning, and, therefore, the notion that the present situation is harmful is spreading. Evidently, Drnovsek, Thaler [foreign minister], and some others do not want to take risks. I see no valid reason why we should continue with the present situation for another year.

Other parties will speak for themselves and state their own views on our initiative. If any party fears that it will not be included in the next government, then, in this light, I understand their desire to prolong their rule as much as possible. Liberal Democracy has already said that this initiative was not alien to it. It will be good if we are in agreement with the LDS on this initiative. It seems that, for the time being, the United List champions a different position. On the other hand, the United List was the first party to react to our initiative for talks. [passage omitted]

[Grah] In a statement for Television Slovenia, Marjan Podobnik said that the Slovene Peoples Party is willing to support the early elections, however, only if a more suitable coalition is formed afterwards. What will you tell him when he demands from you at the talks on early

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elections, which you are proposing, that a coalition of the so-called parties of the Slovene Spring be formed after the elections?

[Peterle] As some other people from this circle of parties have said, forging coalitions in advance does not work. However, if a great harmony or proximity of these parties—which, by merit of many of their characteristics, belong together more than any other coalition—does occur during the program talks, the public can be told about it. However, these talks are yet to be carried out. For the time being, the differences are still very great. For example, regarding the EU, the agricultural policy, and so on. However, it is undisputed that the differences among us are no greater than the differences within the present ruling coalition.

[Grah] Another opposition politician, Janez Jansa, hailed your proposal, implying that you have joined him in the call for early elections. He is now inviting you to join the opposition. What will you reply to him?

[Peterle] We are not an extension of any party, his included. We have our own, autonomous argumentation for the decision. We did not consult the opposition or the ruling parties about it. A year ago, we could not see the right reasons for proposing such a move. Now, however, we can see the reasons and we made it.

[Grah] How would you comment on the reply of Liberal Democracy, which rejects the argumentation with which you are justifying this initiative, but acknowledges the initiative itself, that is, is pledging to study it?

[Peterle] The replies of Liberal Democracy in general tend to be somewhat mixed—a little bit here, a little bit there. Summing it all up, I can nevertheless see the readiness to discuss early elections. I believe that this initiative can, with difficulty, be seriously opposed at present, that is, those who would oppose it would take upon themselves a greater responsibility for the implementation of the government policy than they would in the absence of this initiative.

[Grah] This is precisely what Liberal Democracy reproaches you for. Namely, that you wish to be absolved in advance for the possible poor results of the government policy with this initiative....

[Peterle] We are not afraid for "our" departments. In the departments headed by our ministers, we have something to show. We are not afraid for the results there. However, we do see the problems in general. I am surprised that Liberal Democracy and the United List have not realized that the idea of early elections would be good for them. Looking from the parties' point of view, time is not exactly working for them. Another explanation is also possible: That Liberal Democracy and the United List are opposed to early elections because they do not expect to win at the next elections. It is, thus, simply better for them to maintain the current government for as long as possible.

[Grah] The Christian Democrats stand realistic chances of again becoming the second strongest parliamentary party....

[Peterle] A false assessment. I believe we stand every chance of becoming the first parliamentary party. We are already the second strongest.

[Grah] I would nevertheless continue with my question. The second strongest government party traditionally gets the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Since you ceased to be the foreign minister, foreign affairs have continued to be your main preoccupation. At the same time, you are the party president, a vice president of the European Alliance of the Christian Democratic Parties, and so forth. Therefore, everything points in the direction that, in the new government, you will again compete for the post of foreign minister. Will you?

[Peterle] We are not aspiring to the second post, although I must admit that I have performed the duties of foreign minister with great satisfaction. Our ambition is the same as it was at the local elections: To win first place. At the local elections, Liberal Democracy, with all the parties that joined it, won only half the votes that it would need to safeguard the electoral result from 1992. We made progress in our election results and, at the local level, we became the strongest party. We have realistic chances of confirming this result or even improving it. The new members joining our party after the party convention in Celje speak of this. This latest initiative, too, was followed by a greater influx of new members. In short, I believe that we are not doing badly at all and that we have an initiative.

[Grah] You are, therefore, counting on the prime minister's post?

[Peterle] The post of the prime minister-designate usually goes to the party that wins. This will not necessarily be me.

### Call for Elections Analyzed

*AU0512123995 Ljubljana MAG in Slovene 29 Nov 95 pp 23-25*

[Article by Janez Markes: "Operation Elections"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The question of the so-called unprincipled coalition is open again. The first time, President Kucan tampered with it during the events in Depala Vas and, by doing so, broke up the LDS [Liberal Democracy of Slovenia]-SKD [Slovene

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Christian Democrats]-SDSS [Social Democratic Party of Slovenia] axis. The second time that the coalition underwent a crisis was when Foreign Minister Peterle got the worse of the deal after the Aquileia episode (directly prior to the local elections), decided to resign, and then tried to persuade the party to leave the coalition. The third, and probably the last, time, the Christian Democrats poked the coalition last week, when they supposedly took their partners by surprise with a demand for early elections.

In a statement for the public with the working title "Slovenia, Ahead Through Early Elections," they conclude that Slovene foreign policy is ineffective, that it is not capable of regulating the relations with its neighbors or making any progress in the rapprochement with the European Union, and that Slovenia's international reputation is also declining because we have not appointed an ambassador to Italy nor have we selected a president of the parliamentary foreign affairs' commission. They also conclude that the dynamics of Slovenia's transformation in the economy and other realms is slowing down, and that this situation will deteriorate further during the electoral period.

The initial reactions to the proposal for early elections were immediately divided into two camps, the coalition and the opposition. [passage omitted]

**Joint Interest of Government Parties?**

Both ruling partners, the LDS and the ZLSD [United List of Social Democrats], were surprised, even offended, in their initial reactions to the proposal for early elections. LDS Secretary General Gregor Golobic soon called a news conference and officially explained that the LDS actually did not dismiss the initiative, but merely the arguments for it. Unofficially, we have heard that the ZLSD is also willing to discuss the early elections. Above all, the coalition partners cannot agree with the conclusions about the slowdown in the economy and the ineffectiveness of the foreign policy, but otherwise they can discuss early elections. To prevent the Christian Democrats from going (too) far in their statements, Golobic at the LDS news conference quickly resurrected the Aquileia stereotype and rhetorically asked whether the call for the early elections did not mask the speculations that the next government would be more pliant to the unilateral demands of the foreign countries and that it would be easier to engage in "horse-trading at the expense of the Slovene interests" with the new government. Here, Golobic hit the spot and simultaneously unveiled a detail of their electoral strategy, namely, that the catastrophic situation in the foreign policy and Thaler's blatant diplomatic ineffectiveness (including the deliberate postponement of the problems until the new elections) will be justified with the Aquileia stereotype about the betrayal of the Slovene motherland. Although Liberal Democracy failed with this stereotype in the local elections, it could come more handy this time around, especially if they use it more intelligently than they did then, because all this fiasco in foreign affairs will require an explanation.

Because of the dramatic situation in the foreign policy, the LDS interest doubtlessly matches the SKD proposal for early elections. Another year of such lethargy can have unforeseeable political consequences for Prime Minister Drnovsek and his party. The LDS's argument against the early elections could be privatization. The LDS, also with the help of its coalition partners, now controls a sizable chunk of the economy and the majority of the property transformation processes, which will doubtlessly have a long-lasting effect. However, it is questionable whether this process can be redefined at all or whether a potential new government could influence anything. The posts—for example, the appointments of the public notaries or diplomatic representatives, and especially various life-term posts—have more of less already been agreed upon and divided up. The discontinuity of judicial responsibility in the political and economic spheres has been safeguarded. The control functions are under the government's supervision, while the Public Attorney's Office has lost its autonomy during this mandate, which was the task of [Former Justice] Minister Kozinc. The Agency for Payment Operations (the former Social Accounting Service), which has been autonomous so far, is now supposed to be subordinated to Minister Gaspari, that is, to the Finance Ministry. This agency is probably the last bastion of professional autonomy that is particularly irking the authorities because of the independent stance of its director, Romana Logar.

The early parliamentary elections could, therefore, suit all the government parties, just as they have suited all the opposition parties so far. With them, the ruling parties would blunt the edge of the opposition as the elections would turn into a subject of a joint consensus. However, it will not necessarily happen. The ruling parties will weigh the consequences of this proposal this week. Their reactions indicate that a secret agreement is not likely; however, a Peterle [SKD president]-Kocijanicic [ZLSD president] axis would be more probable than a Peterle-Drnovsek one. The achievement of this would require a very complex political maneuver, of which the Christian Democrats are not capable. Therefore, the proposal for the early elections is rather shaky and out of tune with the political tactics. The least that the SKD should do is to leave the government. However, we cannot ignore one question here: Are the

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Christian Democrats at all capable of the transition from the government to the opposition and, if so, are they capable of doing it convincingly?

**The Public-Opinion Maneuver**

Although the SKD has already stated that it would not leave the coalition until the elections, a consideration of this option is called for because the question tells us more than it asks. It seems that, with its proposal, the SKD attempted to carry out a public opinion maneuver. This supposedly started with the incrimination of Prime Minister Drnovsek in an entirely true Mobitel [Mobile telephone company] affair in which Drnovsek supposedly violated the principle of the incompatibility of profit-making and government posts (he himself is supposed to be the president of this profit-making organization) that he himself imposed on his ministers. The problem is, however, that the Christian Democrats have discovered "the existing situation" in the realm that has, for many years, been linked to the sphere of activity of their [Transportation and Communications] Minister Umek. It is also problematic that they have started to discover something that the entire democratic block has been observing, describing, and protesting against for the past three years. Therefore, this is no longer a revelation, less a convincing one. Realistically, we also cannot expect that the press will jump at the affair in the prevailing political circumstances. To trigger a government crisis by incriminating Drnovsek is utopian and fantasy in the times of semidemocracy.

The experiences gained at the local elections showed that the incrimination of the competition primarily helps the latter. The SKD performed relatively favorably at the local elections for two reasons: Because, within the diminished turnout, "the iron core" of its voters did not fail them and because Liberal Democracy, with Aquileia, carried out an aggressive political maneuver that helped a lot more than it harmed Peterle, who has unbelievable survival skills. It seems that the Christian Democrats did not learn much from this mistake.

It is difficult to shed an impression that the idea about the early elections (which are not to be preceded by excessive dirty laundry) suits all the parties except the deputies (as ZLSD President Kocijancic pointed out) who are afraid for their mandates and the jobs connected to them. It is ironic that, in this pursuit, they are limited by the constitution, which is the only stable and democratic "institution" and which is preventing an even more casual functioning of the state than has been the case thus far.

**Coalition May Expel Christian Democrats**

*AU0512091295 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 1 Dec 95 p 2*

[Article by Vladimir Vodusek: "Would the LDS and the ZLSD Like To Get Rid of the SKD?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Ljubljana, 30 November—The night session of the State Chamber, which, if the length of its minutes is anything to go by, resembled a pallid replica of the endless communist party sessions, has definitely unhinged the grand coalition. According so some reports, Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS] and the United List [ZLSD] will very shortly be proposing to the Christian Democrats [SKD] that they leave the coalition.

Apart from rescuing the TAM enterprise, they indirectly discussed the makeup of the new coalition, that is, whether Slovenia will get a center-left coalition or a coalition without the United List. Dr. Janez Drnovsek did not want to meddle into the big standoff between the SKD and the ZLSD last night; however, today the LDS is seriously thinking about a coalition without the Christian Democrats.

We have learned from party sources that the Christian Democrats will soon be asked to leave the government coalition. At the government session today, the SKD ministers were discreetly warned that if they failed to support the changes to the law on the TAM enterprise, the prime minister will propose the termination of the coalition agreement between Liberal Democracy and the Christian Democrats.

Drnovsek did not get involved in the conflict between the Christian Democrats and the United List. Apart from TAM, a decision about the new right-wing coalition at the forthcoming elections was also "on the table," since, following the last session of parliament, it can already be said that the grand coalition no longer exists.

The Christian Democrats have already debated a possible departure from the coalition on several occasions. However, Transport Minister Igor Umek and Janko Dezelak, minister of economic relations and development, were reportedly opposed to it, while Interior Minister Andrej Ster and Agriculture Minister Joze Osterc were willing to resign.

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## Federal

### Belgrade Announces Team for London, Paris Talks

*LD0512201295 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1921 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 5 Dec (TANJUG)—At a meeting this evening the federal government endorsed the platform for the participation of the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the London conference on 8 and 9 December and the Paris conference on 13 and 14 December, the Federal Secretariat for Information has announced.

In a joint delegation, the FRY will be represented at the Paris conference by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, Montenegrin President Momir Bulatovic, and FRY Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic.

At the London conference, which will be concerned with establishing ways of implementing the agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina reached in Dayton, the FRY will be represented by Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic; the delegation will also include an official representative of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic. [passage omitted]

## Serbia

### SPO Leader: No Reason To Doubt Great Powers

*LD0512154695 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1338 GMT 5 Nov 95*

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 5 Dec (TANJUG)—Vuk Draskovic, president of the Serb Renewal Movement [SPO], said today that peace is the only way out of the calamity that has befallen the people.

"I do not want to join those accusing President Milosevic of selling out the Serbs on the other side of the river Drina in Dayton and humiliating them here," Draskovic told reporters in the International Press Center.

He added that "Milosevic simply accepted what had to be accepted" and said that the peace is neither just nor unjust.

Draskovic said that peace will make possible the necessary changes in society.

"Unfortunately, by opposing the changes and defending the past, certain opposition parties in Serbia are taking advantage of the facts that are favorable to them and creating even more obstacles than before," Draskovic said.

Commenting on Sarajevo's post-Dayton status, he said that there is no reason to doubt the guarantees offered by the great powers.

"I believe that the city will eventually provide an example which will help to encourage reconciliation among all and to reunite the colors of that wonderful ethnic rainbow over Bosnia-Herzegovina," Draskovic said.

### Sandzak Muslims Accuse Police of Ethnic Cleansing

*AU0512173595 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Dec 95 p 9*

[Report by S. Bisevac: "Hermetically Sealed Villages"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Elizabeth Rehn, special rapporteur of the UN commission for human rights in the former Yugoslavia, recently visited Pristina and held talks with the representatives of the Helsinki committee for human rights in Sandzak on the state of human rights in this ethnically mixed community.

The delegation of the Helsinki committee for human rights handed Mrs. Rehn a 120-page report in which they listed examples of violations of civil rights of the Muslim Bosniak population, particularly stressing the situation in the Priboj municipality, and the weapons collecting operation that the authorities have been conducting for three years but only among the Muslims.

Collective and individual human rights are still being violated in Sandzak, but the defeating fact is that the citizens are slowly becoming accustomed to such an unnatural and undemocratic state of affairs, says Sefko Omerovic, chairman of the Helsinki committee for Sandzak.

"The weapons collecting operation is continuing in almost all the Sandzak municipalities. They are even summoning men of 80 years of age. Out of the 1,030 Muslims summoned to local police stations, only 2 percent have been found in possession of weapons," they say in the Helsinki committee. "The weapons collecting operation serves the authorities as an excuse to maintain the tense situation in Sandzak, which leads to the emigration of the Muslim population," says Alija Halilovic, member of the Sandzak Helsinki committee.

The Sandzak Helsinki committee has asked Elizabeth Rehn to visit Sandzak and the Priboj villages of Sastavci, Krajcinovici, Sjeverin, and Zabrnjica, which have been almost hermetically sealed off since October 1993 and the kidnapping of the Muslims in Sjeverin and Strpci for all the nongovernment humanitarian organizations.

"The state bodies are not allowing anyone to visit these villages, and the remaining Muslims live in a kind of quarantine. They cannot move freely, they cannot even go to Priboj," says Sefko Alomerovic, who has himself tried to visit the Priboj villages but to no avail.

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"Some of these villages have been completely ethnically cleansed, and in some, for example Sjeverin, there are only 251 families left with 695 members," Alomerovic adds.

The Sandzak Helsinki committee believes that intolerable conditions are deliberately being created to cleanse ethnically this community from the Muslim-Bosniak population.

Elizabeth Rehn expressed serious concern and promised to visit Sandzak soon to acquaint herself first hand with the state of human rights.

### Krupp Corporation, Trepca To Resume Cooperation

*AU0512163995 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[Report by Vera Rakin]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] A delegation of the German Krupp Corporation is on a three-day visit to our country. A press conference was held in Belgrade following talks on economic cooperation in the Jugometal Company. Vera Rakin has the details.

[Rakin] The top delegation of the Krupp Corporation which is a synonym for German economy includes (Herbert Pannet), director of Krupp's East Europe Division; (Helmut Leimann), director of production; and (Werner Rudolf), technical director. The representatives of the German corporation today held talks with Novak Jelic, general manager of the Trepca Corporation, and representatives of the Jugometal Company.

Just as during yesterday's talks with Dragan Tomic, minister coordinator in the Serbian Government, they reiterated their readiness to resume and further the very successful cooperation that they maintained before the imposition of sanctions. [Words indistinct] in addition to direct trade, the German partners have again shown interest in a joint presence on third markets.

(Herbert Pannet), director of Krupp's East European Division, stressed that there was no reason for not going ahead with concrete agreements in the shortest possible time. That is why we can expect Krupp experts in certain fields to visit our country by the end of the year, and the signing of contracts which will bring profit to both sides, profit that will exceed the one before the imposition of sanctions.

### Zastava Resumes Contact With Foreign Partners

*AU0312140995 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 2 Dec 95*

[Report by Zoran Glisovic from Kragujevac]

[FBIS Translated Text] If it manages to realize all its plans, in the year 2000 the Kragujevac-based plant Zastava should manufacture 200,000 automobiles and trucks. The first step toward this will happen next year when production is estimated at 20,000 to 25,000 vehicles, 50 percent of which will be for export.

This was stated by Zastava general manager Srboljub Vasovic. He also pointed out that following the suspension of sanctions, Zastava was immediately contacted by former clients and business partners from Greece, Germany, Egypt, Brazil, Russia, Italy, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and other countries who wish either to resume or establish new cooperation. Their demands for automobiles, Vasovic said, exceed what Zastava can realistically produce at the moment.

At the news conference, journalists were informed that preliminary contracts have been signed for the supply of non-assembled automobiles to the Egyptian company (Elnasco) in Cairo, and with a partner in the Russian Novosibirsk region for the founding of a joint company for the manufacture of trucks.

The Special Purposes Production plant, that is, sports and hunting weapons, has already made initial contact with foreign clients on the export of its products in December, amounting to $3 million.

Also addressed was the second phase of the economic recovery program. The company believes that the measures will have a beneficial influence on Zastava. However, caution was expressed regarding the issue of liberalizing car imports because it is felt that it will not benefit Zastava in the period of recovering from the consequences of sanctions and the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia. In connection with this, it was suggested that the state limit imports for the sake of the domestic automobile industry, in the same way the EU protects its domestic automobile industry from Japanese cars.

## Montenegro

### Economic Cooperation Protocol Signed With Albania

*LD0512222695 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2218 GMT 5 Dec 95*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Podgorica, Yugoslavia, Dec 5 (TANJUG)—Montenegrin Minister of Industry, Energy

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and Mining Miodrag Gomilanovic and Albania Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy Abdul Xhaja signed a protocol on economic cooperation in Montenegro's capital of Podgorica on Tuesday.

The document envisages for intensifying cooperation, especially in the electric power industry, the oil industry, trade and geological research, said a statement released after the meeting.

Minister Xhaja, who heads an Albanian delegation on a two-day visit to Montenegro, told reporters that cooperation in the electric power industry and a linkage of power generating facilities was a priority, and announced an exchange of electric power.

Xhaja emphasised the importance of cooperation in oil research and possible joint ventures of Albania's Al Petrol and Yugoslavia's Jugopetrol Oil companies. He said that the two sides had agreed to draw geological charts of the border area.

Albania shares a border with Montenegro which, together with Serbia, forms the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Gomilanovic, for his part, told reporters that the talk had also touched on restoring the railway line between Podgorica and the Albanian town of Shkoder (Scutari).

Albanian Minister Xhaja was on Tuesday received also by Montenegrin Vice Premier Asim Telacevic and Foreign Minister Janko Jeknic.

Minister Jeknic repeated the invitation issued by Montenegrin Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic while on a visit to Albania to Albanian Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi to visit Montenegro.

**Officials Negotiate Importing Electricity**

*AU0612102795 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 5 Dec 95 p 16*

[BETA report: "Difference Is Compensated By Hooking on Other Systems"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Niksic—Montenegro is consuming twice as much electricity as it is producing. The difference is compensated for by illegally tapping into other electrical systems, MONTENA FAX reported yesterday.

The Perucica hydro power plant should have produced 1.2 million kilowatts of electricity yesterday. Serbia is supplying daily 2.88 million kilowatts of electricity to Montenegro from the Piva hydro power plant. The daily consumption exceeds, however, 9 million kilowatts. The Perucica, Krupac, and Slani accumulation lakes currently have enough water to generate only 20 million kilowatts of electricity. The potential of the inflowing water has fallen to 60 megawatts.

The Electricity Board of Montenegro claims that negotiations are well under way with the neighboring countries to import 120-150 megawatts of constant electricity despite the fact that there is no foreign currency to pay for this amount of power. The Electricity Board has therefore appealed to the consumers to save electricity.

**Effect of Sanctions on Maritime Fleet Viewed**

*AU0112075595 Podgorica MONITOR in Serbo-Croatian 24 Nov 95 p 30*

[Report by Dino Ramovic: "The Anchor Is Being Weighed"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On the day in late May 1992 when the UN Security Council adopted the decision by which economic sanctions were imposed on Montenegro and Serbia, the Montenegrin maritime companies "Jugooceanija" of Kotor, and "Prekookeanska Plovidba" of Bar had 39 vessels registered in the international register of vessels. At that time, the Montenegrin merchant fleet was one of the most important in the Mediterranean. It earned around $100 billion a year, which accounted for 20 percent of the total hard-currency income of the republic.

At the moment sanctions were imposed, the vessels were in various harbors around the world, where they were confined. Twelve ships owned by "Prekookeanska Plovidba" and 11 owned by "Jugooceanija" were confiscated in this way. In order to save the ships from being sold or confiscated by other states—because of debts or for similar reasons—an arrangement was made with Chinese authorities, since eight ships of the Kotor company and five of the Bar company lay at anchor in Chinese harbors. Only three ships owned by "Prekookeanska Plovidba" remained in Montenegrin harbors (the Sveti Stefan and the Alba, which were at anchor in Bar, and the Sumadija owned by the "Jugooceanija" of Kotor, which was being overhauled in Bijela at the time of the introduction of sanctions).

The rescuing of the Montenegrin fleet started relatively late. The ships were first entered into the registers of the Malta and the Panama fleets, so that they sailed under their flags for a short period of time. This attempt failed, but it is interesting that some people from circles close to the government are only now "disclosing" the truth that it would have been possible to save the ships by returning them to their domestic harbors at the moment when it was already certain that the sanctions would be imposed. Some company leaders pointed to this possibility and even insisted on it. It was obviously

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believed, however, that the sanctions would be of a short duration, so that the representatives of the federal and republic authorities assessed that the cost of the return of the ships to the domestic harbors of Bar and Kotor would have been too great. It remains unknown, however, how much all this would have really cost and how it would compare to the devastation of the fleet and the enormous price paid for its present "survival." In any case, the threats of sanctions lasted over a long period of time, so while it would not have been necessary for the ships to load new freight, they could have returned to Bar and Kotor.

The ships have been ruined in the meantime, the fleet maintenance costs have risen enormously, and many highly qualified personnel have found employment on foreign ships. According to the information we obtained from the Ministry of Maritime Trade and Traffic, five ships had been sold at auctions (two owned by "Prekookeanska Plovidba"—Rumija and Bor—and three owned by "Jugooceanija"—Kapetan Martinovic, Prvi February, and Admiral Zmajevic) since the introduction of the sanctions in order to pay off creditors. The companies have pointed out that these were old ships that would not have been able to sail for a long time, so they are not very sorry to have sold them. The Bar company has since sold two more old ships, the Cetinje, which lay damaged at anchor in Liverpool, and the Danilovgrad, which was built 20 years ago. Also, two more ships are now sailing under special conditions for Norway.

As Mr. Jusuf Kalamperovic, the vice manager of "Prekookeanska Plovidba," told the MONTENA-FAX Agency, this company intended to sell all of its old ships and use this money plus the $10 million it has in London for the renewal of the remaining ships and the acquisition of new and modern vessels. According to Mr. Kalamperovic, the "Prekookeanska Plovidba" Company would be happy if, one or two months after the sanctions are lifted, it could resume its activities with seven or eight ships. The situation in "Jugooceanija" of Kotor is similar. This company has so far sold six of its own ships to pay its foreign creditors and enable the rest of its fleet to survive and feels it could sail with only two or three of its ships within two or three months after the lifting of the sanctions.

What both Montenegrin companies have in common is that their ships have been badly damaged since the introduction of the sanctions, so they have lost the corresponding quality classifications and the certificates and licenses. A lot of money will be needed for the renewal of the documents and for repairs. Crews will be another problem. "Jugooceanija" used to employ 1,500 professionals, whose number has fallen to 600; 250 of them are still on unpaid leave.

Despite all these difficulties, the Montenegrin maritime companies and the Montenegrin Government are determined to work on the renovation of the Montenegrin maritime fleet and the restoration of the esteem it had before the introduction of the sanctions. The National Bank of Yugoslavia granted them a $30 million loan, which will be spent on the preparation of the ships for sailing and on the payment of debts caused by layups in foreign harbors during the sanctions. New licenses will also cause considerable costs. It is not necessary to waste words on why Montenegro is in such a position. It can be expected, however, that this problem will be discussed in a different economic and political atmosphere.

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